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A most innovative and troublesome current development in American
public law is the suddenly expanded use of the congressional veto device for
control of the federal administration. From a constitutional law exotic
largely confined to the Federal Reorganization Acts' and little noticed even
by specialists, the veto has become in the post-Watergate years an almost
routine addition to any statute delegating significant administrative power.
At the outset it may suffice to say by way of definition that the
congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature or some part, such as
one house or even a committee, can block or modify administrative action
taken under a statute. Because the legislative action does not rise to the
dignity of a statutory amendment, the President's constitutionally prescribed
veto power is avoided. Further, the bicameral principle is offended if the
action is by less than a resolution of both houses. The effect, nevertheless, is
basic policymaking by the Congress in nonstatutory form.2 Constitutional
problems, in addition to general separation of powers considerations, arise
under both the specific article I provisions concerning the presidential role in
the basic lawmaking process, 3 and the specific article II reservation of
administration of statutes to the Executive. 4
The intensified congressional interest in the legislative veto device lies
at the center of a fine paradox in our governmental system. There is tension
between the persistent tug of the town meeting democracy concept, which
points toward legislative supremacy and views representatives as the
tribunes of the people, and the more subtle separation of powers principles
upon which the Constitution rests. While most citizens may concede that the
1. See notes 15 & 27 and text accompanying notes 13, 27 & 28 infra.
2. For a more *detailed definition of legislative veto see note 14 infra.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
4. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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type of regulatory and service activity that "contemporary public opinion
requires the state to engage in can, as a practical matter, be carried on only
by the executive branch of the government," 5 the accretion of discretionary
authority in the executive branch through loose delegations of power by
Congress is not accepted with equanimity. The tension has deep roots,
traceable to our early political theory. As former Attorney General Levi has
noted, in 1776 separation of powers was a slogan of the Revolution meaning
that power was to be "separated from the executive and given to legisla-
tures. '"6 By 1787, as a reaction to legislative excesses in the interregnum
period, a true separation of powers doctrine emerged "as a criticism of
legislative power and was central to the theory of the new government." 7
As a device for controlling administrative action the congressional veto
in the present day would be expected to strike a responsive chord among
those concerned about the magnitude and power of the modern administra-
tive state. Former President Nixon's Watergate gave added timbre. When
Watergate emotion and separation of powers reason clash, the former is
aided both by the populist feelings that have revived in the mid-seventies
8
and by the fact that the model of government that is the simplest and easiest
to grasp is the legislative model.
We still operate, however, under the 1787 Constitution augmented by
judicial review, and although separation of powers disputes are not the
favorite fodder of the judiciary, congressional veto issues finally began to be
litigated in 1976. By 1977 the litigation had produced the first major
scrutiny at the court of appeals level 9 and a major ruling on the merits in the
Court of Claims.10
Without attempting a definitive survey of all the past writing11 or of all
experience under the now multitudinous congressional veto provisions, this
5. Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American
Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1955).
6. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. RE'. 371, 374 (1976).
7. Id. at 375.
8. Such populist feelings were an important factor in the determination of the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates in August 1976 not to reindorse the ABA's 14-year-old
statement against the congressional veto. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF AcTION OF
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 24 (1976).
9. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark
v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), discussed at text accompanying notes 171-93 infra.
10. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cf. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718
(1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 251-73 infra.
11. See generally J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964); C.
NORTON, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW, DEFERRAL AND DISAPPROVAL OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS: A
SUMMARY AND INVENTORY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY (Library of Congress Congressional
Research Service JK 1015C 76-88G, 1976); N. SMALL, THE COMMITTEE VETO: ITS CURRENT USE
AND APPRAISALS OF ITS VALIDITY (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service JK
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essay will provide background needed to place the constitutional issues and
the litigation in context. It will focus particularly on the hypothesis, not
inconsistent with the litigation to date, that under a separation of powers
"purpose" analysis the use of the congressional veto device to check day-
by-day administration of the government is both unconstitutional and un-
wise, but that its use may be harmless in the context of discrete legislation.
In the latter instance the roles of the President and Congress may be viewed
as reversed, without destroying the parity in lawmaking contemplated by
article I. Possible examples include the authorization under the Salary Act
for the President to submit periodic revisions in salaries for high officials
subject to a one-house veto, 12 and perhaps the similar formula in the
sequence of Federal Reorganization Acts, including the current one obtained
by President Carter.13
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO CONCEPT
In historical perspective the legislative veto as a device for controlling
administrative activities14 is a quite recent development dating essentially
1015C A-179, 1967); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional
Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Newman & Keaton,
Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators,
41 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1953); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983 (1975).
12. See Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
13. Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-912 (West 1977). See also note 27 and
text accompanying notes 27 & 28 infra.
14. The term "legislative veto" is generally used at the federal level to mean action taken
by Congress or a congressional subgroup to control implementation of a particular executive
action. Statutes authorizing this form of legislative control have given it varying forms. The
veto power has been granted to both houses, one house or a congressional committee. The form
can be either negative (requiring disapproval of the action), or more rarely, affirmative (requir-
ing approval of the action). Usually the negative form provides that the action will be-
come effective after a specified period if there is no action formally disapproving it, so that it
is possible for executive acts to be implemented without any action by the group with the veto
power. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 11, at 468-69.
Committee veto provisions frequently take the form of "come into agreement" or "no
appropriations" requirements. The "come into agreement" provision requires that the agency
and the designated congressional committee reach an agreement before the agency may act. For
example, the committee might have to approve the terms under which an agency would acquire
or dispose of property. Under a "no appropriations" provision the substantive committee, as
distinguished from appropriations committees, will scrutinize all agency requests for expendi-
ture of funds above a certain amount. Such a provision is usually attached to public buildings
construction bills. The Public Works Committees of both houses are given the power to
approve all requests for expenditures in excess of a specified amount for any one project. See,
e.g., Ginnane, supra note 11, at 599-604.
Some commentators have included in their definitions of the legislative veto what is known
as a "report and wait" or "laying provision." These provisions require that an agency action be
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from a governmental reorganization act in 1932, although there were occa-
sional earlier manifestations.15 In general, the frequency was low until
1970, but has increased rapidly since 1974. For example, H. Lee Watson's
tabulation of statutes authorizing congressional action on major matters by
simple (one-house) or concurrent resolution shows that in the first six
months of President Ford's administration, which began on August 9, 1974,
there were ten examples. The prior ten statutes containing such provisions
occurred in the Nixon administration between 1969 and mid-1974. Between
1959 and 1969, however, there were only four examples. 16 A Library of
Congress survey for the period 1932 through 1975, which also includes
statutes authorizing the committee veto that has become common in respect
to public building construction, found 295 congressional review provisions
in 196 laws. 7 For the year 1975 alone the survey found fifty-eight legisla-
tive review -provisions in twenty-one acts of Congress. Administrative
decisions on a wide variety of subjects, including the extensive education
grants program, foreign assistance, energy policy and research, agriculture,
trade agreements and arms control, have been placed under such legislative
disapproval provisions. 1 8
This development represents a significant attempt by Congress to move
from vigorous oversight of the executive, through hearings, reports and
revision of statutes, to shared administration19 under existing statutory
submitted to Congress or one of the above mentioned congressional subgroups for a specified
period of time. "Report and wait" provisions have also been viewed as not properly allocable
to the legislative veto classification, because if Congress decides to take further action on the
subject it must do so through regular legislative processes. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 11, at
1060-65. See also Miller & Knapp, supra note 11, at 371-74.
15. See Watson, supra note 11, at 1004-09. Watson outlines the development of the use of
concurrent (two-house) and simple (one-house) resolutions to retain control over the subject
matter of laws passed by Congress. Early attempts to use these forms of control were
spasmodic and did not affect large issues of policy. Some met with presidential opposition, or
were questioned in Congress. Others were made moot by circumstances that prevented
congressional exercise of its powers. Control was more successful in areas such as printing and
selection of land for historic memorials. Id. After the Reorganization Act of 1932, ch. 314, 47
Stat. 382 (formerly codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 38, 39, 41 U.S.C.), this manner of
legislative control became increasingly common, and involved Congress in basic substantive
decisions not directed to enactment of statutes. See Watson, supra at 1009-29.
16. Watson, supra note 11, at 1089-92.
17. C. NORTON, supra note 11, at i. The statutes are tabulated at id. at 8-12. These figures
include "report and wait" provisions, which many commentators -consider constitutional. See
note 14 supra.
18. C. NORTON, supra note 11, at 8-12. The Congressional Research Service has tabulated
instances between 1960 and 1975 when a resolution was filed in the House or Senate for the use
of a legislative veto. The figures have been reprinted in Cohen, Junior Members Seek Approval
for Wider Use of the Legislative Veto, 9 NAT'L J. 1228, 1230 (1977). Of the 351 resolutions filed
during the period, 224 were filed during 1974 and 1975.
19. Dixon, Congress, Shared Administration, and Executive Privilege, in CONGRESS
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 126-28 (H. Mansfield ed. 1975).
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delegations. Sometimes the President has acquiesced in silence by approv-
ing the bills, but the general presidential response has been one of opposi-
tion, whether or not directly expressed. 20 With increasing frequency there
have been signing statements protesting the inclusion of the legislative
review provisions, or outright vetoes, such as the unsuccessful veto by
President Nixon of the War Powers Resolution in 1973.21
President Ford in his early months in office signed several measures
without objection, but his administration later developed a hard-line ap-
proach. The Department of Justice vigorously opposed the congressional
veto on constitutional grounds in a series of congressional hearings, 22 the
20. Upon signing the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, ch. 11, §§ 2-10, 55 Stat. 31 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 411-419 (1970)), President Roosevelt took the unusual action of
submitting to then Attorney General Robert Jackson a private memorandum expressing his
grave reservations about the constitutionality of the veto provision it contained. He labeled the
provision "clearly unconstitutional," but because of the urgent need for the bill he felt he could
not afford to offend his political allies by public objection to the provision. Jackson, A
Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1953). Justice Jackson was to make
the memorandum public when it could be done without embarrassment, which he did in 1953.
Id. at 1357.
Watson found that President Wilson, and every President from Hoover through Ford, had
objected to the legislative device on one occasion or another, but that there were some
inconsistencies. Watson, supra note 11, at 1004-29. See also Cooper & Cooper, supra note iI,
at 470 n.l1.
John Bolton suggests that political considerations have frequently tempered presidential
opposition to legislative veto provisions and calls for judicial recognition of this factor when
and if a decision on the constitutionality of the veto is reached. See J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLA-
TIVE VETO: UNSEPARAT1NG THE POWERS 10-12 (1977).
21. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 542 Without
His Approval, 9 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973); White House Statement
Following Action by the Congress Overriding the President's Veto, 9 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1312 (Nov. 7, 1973); see War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V 1975).
22. The main points of the arguments were based on the principle of separation of powers,
specific constitutional provisions establishing the presidential veto and pragmatic objections.
The separation of powers argument did not include labeling of some actions as inherently
executive, legislative or judicial. The Justice Department recognized that clear-cut distinctions
of that type are frequently impossible:
Some [governmental action] might be performed by any of the three branches-and in
that situation it is up to Congress to allocate the responsibility. . . . Once it has done
so, however, once Congress has so allocated the responsibility, the very essence of
separation of powers requires that Congress cannot control the discharge of functions
assigned to the executive or the courts, except through the plenary legislative process-
es of amendment and repeal.
Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory Agencies: Hearings on S. 2258, S.
2716, S. 2812, S. 2878, S. 2903, S. 2925, S. 3318, and S. 3428 Before the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976) (citation omitted) (statement of
Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia).
The added level of congressional scrutiny was viewed as making less likely judicial review
of an agency regulation that had been approved by Congress (or left untouched by Congress if
the veto provision required no affirmative action). The Department also felt that the veto would
not really be effective in forcing upon Congress meaningful oversight; it would serve only to
truncate the constitutionally prescribed process for enactment of legislation by creating a
procedure for avoidance of the presidential veto, and, in the case of the one-house veto, for
avoidance of the concurrence of both houses. Id. at 80-81. For other Department of Justice
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President began to question the propriety of the legislative veto provisions in
some bills he signed,23 and vetoed seven on this ground. 24 The Ford
statements see Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438
Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on
International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1976) (statement of Antonin Scalia); Congres-
sional Review of Administration Rulemaking: Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and Related
Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1975); Congressional Oversight of Executive
Agreements-1975: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167, 173-74, 183-87 (1975)
(testimony of Antonin Scalia). See also Symposium, 1976 Bicentennial Institute-Oversight and
Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 AD. L. REV. 575, 684 (1976) (statement of Antonin
Scalia).
23. President Ford's Signing Statements: Education Amendments of 1974, The Presi-
dent's Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1056 (Aug. 21,
1974) (Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.));
Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, Statement by the President on Signing the Bill Into Law,
While Expressing Reservations About One of Its Provisions, I 1 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
560 (May 26, 1975) (Pub. L. No. 94-25, 89 Stat. 90 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.)); Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 7710, Which Includes
Amendments to the Child Support Provisions of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 11 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 856 (Aug. 11, 1975) (Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, 89 Stat. 433
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)); Statement by the President on Signing S. 3065
Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 857 (May 11, 1976) (Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18,
26 U.S.C.)); Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 13680 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 1104 (July 1, 1976) (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.));
Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 3884 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1340 (Sept. 14, 1976) (National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 10, 16, 50 U.S.C.)).
24. President Ford's Veto Messages: President's Message to the House of Representa-
tives Returning H.R. 15323 Without His Approval, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1279 (Oct.
12, 1974) (Atomic Energy Act Amendments); President's Message to the House of Representa-
tives Returning H.R. 8617 Without His Approval, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 643 (Apr.
12, 1976) (Hatch Act Amendments); President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2262
Without His Approval, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc..643 (Apr. 12, 1976) (Foreign Assis-
tance Bill); President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 12567 Without
His Approval, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRFs. Doc. 1142 (July 7, 1976) (Appropriations Bill for
Federal Fire Prevention and Control); President's Message to the House of Representatives
Returning H.R. 12944 Without His Approval, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1261 (Aug. 13,
1976) (extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act); President's
Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5446, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1486 (Oct. 10,
1976) (International Navigational Rules Act of 1976); President's Memorandum of Disapproval
of S. 2081, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1541 (Oct. 20, 1976) (Agricultural Resources
Conservation Bill).
During his administration President Ford's position on the legislative veto changed from
one of remonstrance to one of rejection. The development is evidenced not only by the content
of his statements, but also by their time sequence. In 1974 he vetoed only one bill, and made
only one signing statement that commented on the device. After this first veto, President Ford
did not exercise his veto power to discourage the use of the congressional veto provisions until
April of 1976. Between April and October of 1976 he vetoed six bills containing the device. As
his political position strengthened he seemed to progress from the caution born of the inherent
weakness of his post-Watergate appointment, coupled with the natural tendency of a former
Congressman to support strong congressional control of the Executive, see Education Amend-
ments of 1974, The President's Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, supra note 23, at 1057,
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administration also saw the first attempt by Congress to shift from its
practice of adding legislative veto provisions to bills on an ad hoc basis to
adoption of a general requirement of congressional review. Hearings were
held on a proposed amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act 25 to
require congressional review of administrative rulemaking before the rules
to an increasing awareness of the need to defend the Executive from congressional desire to
control directly administrative functions. The Atomic Energy Act Amendments, vetoed in
1974, contained one of the more unusual versions of a legislative veto. Even if the President had
signed it, the effectiveness of the Act itself, dealing with recompense for a nuclear accident,
would have been held in abeyance until Congress had an opportunity to react to a forthcoming
relevant study, and perhaps then, to block all implementation of the contemplated program by
concurrent resolution. President Ford characterized the proposed bill as "merely the expres-
sion of an intent to legislate." President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning
H.R. 15323 Without His Approval, supra at 1279. In effect, Congress here was reversing the
normal legislative process and asking for presidential approval of substantive legislation before
Congress was ready to commit itself to support the legislation. For an analysis of "reverse
legislation" in fields not involving administration of a program, see text accompanying notes
274-78 infra.
President Ford's signing statements commenting on the congressional veto also increased
in frequency during his administration. He objected to one congressional veto provision in
1974, two in 1975, and three in 1976. President Ford's earliest statement expressing disapproval
characterized the veto provision as "troublesome." He felt that "attempting to stretch the
constitutional role of the Congress is not the best remedy" when Congress is faced with the
frustrations of dealing with the executive branch. Education Act Amendments of 1974, The
President's Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, supra at 1057. On the basis of a re-
port from the Attorney General in 1975 President Ford began to take a firmer stance. In all of
his subsequent signing statements and veto messages the following general themes are
reiterated: The provisions violate article I, § 7; they would involve the Congress in "day-to-day
executive functions in derogation of the principle of separation of powers, resulting in the
erosion of the fundamental constitutional distinction between the role of the Congress in
enacting legislation and the role of the Executive in carrying it out." Statement by the President
on Signing H.R. 13680 Into Law, supra note 23, at 1105.
President Ford's position on the status of the allegedly unconstitutional congressional veto
provisions in the bills he did sign underwent a similar modification during the course of his
administration. In the first two statements he did not comment on their potential severability.
Instead his comments were restricted to the undesirability of the veto provisions, and the
general desirability of the subject of the legislation. For example, while signing the Amtrak
Improvement Act of 1975, he noted that he signed it because of the nation's need for passenger
rail service. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, Statement by the President on Signing the Bill
into Law, While Expressing Reservations About One of Its Provisions, supra note 23, at 856. In
Ford's later signing statements he signalled a policy of noncompliance with veto provisions. In
August of 1975 he directed the Secretary of HEW to regard the veto provision as simply a
request for information. Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 7710, Which Includes
Amendments to the Child Support Provisions of Title IV of the Social Security Act, supra note
23, at 856. He directed the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of the veto
provision contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments in May 1976.
Statement by the President on Signing S. 3065 Into Law, supra note 23, at 857-58. He noted that
the veto contained in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act had
never been exercised, and that he was reserving his position until the question of constitutional-
ity had been raised directly in July 1976. Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 13680
Into Law, supra at 1105. Finally, in September of 1976, President Ford announced that he
would treat the veto provision in the National Emergencies Act as severable. Statement by
the President on Signing H.R. 3884 Into Law, supra note 23, at 1340.
25. H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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could go into effect.26 As is always the case in interbranch disputes, these
proposals had broad bipartisan support.
The full reaction of the Carter administration to the congressional veto
movement is not yet known. Even before the new President was sworn in
the issue arose in the context of his request for renewed Reorganization Act
authority, which had lapsed during the second Nixon administration and not
been renewed under President Ford. Here, despite some backing and filling
on the side issue of the particular manner of the congressional veto,27 he was
26. Had this bill been adopted it would have expanded the description of agency
rulemaking and limited the types of agency action exempt from review to matters relating to
agency management or personnel or matters relating to national defense or foreign affairs that
are properly classified by Executive order. The act would have authorized disapproval by
concurrent resolution or disapproval by one house without disagreement from the other house.
Id.
27. The Administration proposal, see H.R. 3407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3442,
95th Cong., I st Sess. (1977), retained the veto from the Reorganization Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
95-17, § 2, 91 Stat. 29 (presently codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-912 (West. 1977)).
Reorganization plans would become effective after 60 days unless disapproved by either house
of Congress. Plans could go into effect without any action by Congress under this type of veto
provision.
Congressman Jack Brooks was a major opponent of the Carter reorganization bill. His own
proposed bill granting reorganization authority, H.R. 3131, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), would
have required an affirmative vote by both houses of Congress to approve any plan. He tried "to
preserve all the authority past Presidents have had to reorganize the Government," but also "to
keep it clearly within the constitutional confines of our legislative process. The Constitution,
after all, says all legislative power shall be vested in Congress. If a plan cannot survive a vote in
Congress, it simply should not become law." H.R. REP. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10
(1977).
President Carter maintained his stance on the constitutionality of a negative one-house
veto after receiving the view of Attorney General Griffin Bell that the veto in this instance did
not violate separation of powers principles. Letter from Griffin Bell to President Carter (Jan.
31, 1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 105, supra at 10-I1 [hereinafter cited as Bell, Letter to
the President]. The Justice Department opinion stated that the proposed veto, when kept in the
narrow context of executive reorganization, did not alter the balance of powers between the
executive and the legislative branches. Assistant Attorney General John Harmon distinguished
the Reorganization Act veto from the veto as it applies to an ongoing program. Unlike an
ongoing program context the President has "ultimate veto power" in his decision not to submit
reorganization plans. Harmon pointed out that in an ongoing program this flexibility, which
serves to protect the President from congressional coercion, is often not available. Letter from
John Harmon to Senator Abraham Ribicoff (Feb. 14, 1977) (copy on file with author). Harmon
has since reasserted this distinction in relation to a proposed congressional veto provision to be
added to the Refugee Act of 1977. Letter from John Harmon to Representative Joshua Eilberg
(Apr. 1, 1977) (copy on file with author).
The final proposal that became the Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-912
(West 1977), did involve some compromise as a result of the Brooks/Carter difference of
opinion. The bill requires "(by request)" pro forma resolutions of disapproval of reorganization
plans. Id. § 910. A resolution of disapproval causes the bill to go before the appropriate
congressional committees. If there is no committee recommendation after 45 days the commit-
tee is discharged automatically. Id. § 911. The resolution is then subject to a motion for a floor
vote, leading to a potential one-house veto. Id. § 912. Of course, if there is no motion there will
be no floor vote. Although the compromise seems to have produced only cosmetic changes in
the Carter proposal for renewed reorganization authority in the previous one-house veto
format, the Committee on Government Operations expressed the belief that, "this procedure
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
willing to pay the usual price exacted by Congress since 1932 and to accept
its veto power.28 In regard to substantive legislation, too, the accession to
power of a Democratic President did not cause Congress to lose its newly
acquired taste for inducing administrators, under threat of a potential veto,
to develop modes of participatory administration with key members of
Congress .29
will virtually assure a vote by both the House and the Senate on every plan." H.R. REP. No.
105, supra at 17.
28. See Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-912 (West 1977). The legislative
veto provision appears in id. § 906.
29. For example, H.R. 116, ch. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which was before the
Judiciary Committee in 1977, would allow Congress to disapprove of agency rules by concur-
rent resolution or by a one-house veto if the other house did not object. In either case Congress
would have 90 days to consider regulations. Id. § 602. The proposed bill also permits either
house to direct agency reconsideration of a rule. If one house passes this resolution during the
initial 90 day waiting period the proposed rule shall not go into effect. If reconsideration is
directed for a rule that is already in effect the rule shall lapse within 180 days if the agency has
failed to submit a revised rule to Congress. Id. § 603. The possibilities for delay in implementa-
tion of rules subjected to this procedure are considerable. The initial waiting period is 90 days,
with the possibility of a resolution to reconsider, causing a new round of public hearing, a new
rule and another 90 day waiting period. The use of a resolution to reconsider any rule, including
rules already in effect, would add to the potent negotiation power. See text accompanying notes
92-94 infra.
The final version of the bill to create a new Department of Energy, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-
7352 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977), that was passed in Congress on August 2, 1977, see 123
CONG. REC. S13,279, S13,291 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977), does not include a congressional veto
provision. The House version of the bill, H.R. 6804, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 CONo.
REC. H5406 (daily ed. June 3, 1977), passed in the House on June 3, 1977, did contain a one-
house veto provision that would have applied to any regulation, other than a fuel pricing rule,
proposed by the Department of Energy or by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Senator Schweiker attempted to include a similar provision in the Senate bill, which would have
given Congress a one-house, non-item veto over all regulations proposed by the Secretary of
Energy, but the amendment was defeated on the floor of the Senate. 123 CONG. REC. S7943-45
(daily ed. May 18, 1977).
President Carter began to show hostility to the use of congressional veto provisions during
his first year in office. He vetoed one bill, citing as one reason the congressional veto provision,
and attacked the constitutionality of veto provisions on three occasions in his signing state-
ments. He vetoed the Department of Energy Authorization Bill (the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor Bill), citing the veto provisions as "not consistent with Administration policies and the
national interest," and as a limitation on the "constitutional authority of the President." Veto
of Department of Energy Authorization Bill, Message to Senate Returning S. 1811 Without
Approval, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1726 (Nov. 5, 1977).
His language condemning the congressional veto in his signing statements has grown
stronger. In his first statement he merely noted that the veto "may violate Article I, Section 7 of
the Constitution." International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Statement on Signing H.R. 186
Into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1128 (July 28, 1977) (Pub. L. No. 95-75, 91 Stat. 308
(codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1608 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977))). In his second
signing statement he said the veto has "the potential of involving Congress in the execution of
the laws." International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Statement on Signing H.R. 6884 Into
Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1185 (Aug. 5, 1977) (Pub. L. No. 95-92, 91 Stat. 614
(codified at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977))). Upon
signing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act the President announced his inten-
tion to treat the veto provision as a "report and wait" provision. Presidential War Powers Bill,
Statement Signing H.R. 7738 Into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1941 (Dec. 28, 177)
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Such a negotiation power, with teeth, is perhaps the most significant
aspect of the broadened congressional veto power. The manner in which it is
changing the conventional relationship between the Executive and members
of Congress, and blurring lines of political accountability, merits careful
study, whether or not it is ultimately deemed offensive to the separation of
powers doctrine. 30 Beyond the scope of this essay, but also meriting careful
analysis, is the concurrent increase during the past few years in legislative
veto provisions affecting administration of state governments. 31
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL VETO
A. General Separation of Powers Considerations
Justice Frankfurter opened his separation of powers opinion in the
Presidential Steel Seizure Case32 with an observation perhaps more humor-
ous than instructive: "Before the cares of the White House were his own,
President Harding is reported to have said that government after all is a very
simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a fleeting inhabitant of
fairyland.' 33 Subsequently, the Justice observed that the authority of the
three branches is not to be gleaned "from an abstract analysis," for the
Constitution is a "framework for government. 34 Judges and other
commentators, before and since, have talked about the interaction and
(War or National Emergency-Presidential Powers, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(codified at scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 4 1978))).
30. For some preliminary studies see Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
ministrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); S.
Kurzman, Memorandum of Citations and Descriptions of Statutes Administered by HEW
Which Condition Effectiveness of Departmental Action on Congressional Approval, reprinted
in ABA SEPARATION OF POWERS COMMrrEE, 1974-1975 REPORT app. B.
31. Although the provisions at the state level vary considerably, and some provide merely
for a waiting period to provide opportunity for the legislature to react by the usual statutory
mode, approximately 25 states now have some provisions for legislative review or veto of
various forms of administrative action. Legislative Improvement and Modernization Commit-
tee, National Conference of State Legislatures, Legislative Review of Administrative Regula-
tions, Final Report (2d draft as amended June 11, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina
Law Review). Litigation under state constitutional separation of powers provisions has pro-
duced varied results. Decisions upholding the provisions include Watrous v. Golden Chamber
of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950); State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La.
298, 161 So. 871 (1935); Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 572 (1972). Decisions
invalidating the provisions include State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d
786 (1976); In re Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, -Mass.-, 341 N.E. 2d 254 (1976);
Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950); Moran v. La Guardia, 270 N.Y. 450, 1
N.E.2d 961 (1936).
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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cooperation of the branches, and stressed the checks and balances as well as
the separation of powers. 35
To say this is not to say that separation of powers defies rational
inquiry. We approach reasonably firm ground when there is a conjunction of
intent of the Framers, relevant constitutional text, longstanding practice and
understandings, and the requirements of the basic political theory that
distinguishes our system from the parliamentary system. In respect to the
congressional veto there seems to be the basis for such a conjunction.
The Framers were neither reticent on separation of powers nor overly
friendly to the legislative power. 36 As already noted, 37 there had been a
reversion from the legislative supremacy theory of the Revolution to a
concern for "stability and energy in government.'' 38 The solution to this
concern, while maintaining the "vital principles of liberty," 39 was separa-
tion of powers, for "[tihe accumulation of all powers, legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny. "40 It was made clear that the particular source of
the feared tyranny was the "legislative department," which among the new
states was "everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all
power into its impetuous vortex." '41 Madison returned to the separation
theme as a member of the House of Representatives in the First Congress:
"If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution,
more sacred than another, it is just that it separates the legislative, Execu-
tive, and judicial powers." 42
Of particular relevance to the congressional veto issue is the manner in
which the Constitutional Convention followed through on the concern for
35. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contem-
plates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id. at 635
(Jackson, J., concurring).
36. For a detailed analysis of the constitutional debates and contemporary writings on the
relation of various extra-legislative control devices to the purposes of the Framers, see Watson,
supra note 11, at 1029-48. As a guide to constitutional validity he suggests testing particular
uses of the legislative veto device against the following four criteria concerning the proper role
of Congress: (1) Does the particular use in question force the legislator to choose between his
constituency and the national interest; (2) does it encourage the exercise of self-interest; (3)
does it tend toward legislative dominance of the government; and (4) does it foster increase of
overall federal power by weakening separation of powers friction? Id. at 104849.
37. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 267 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
39. Id. at 268.
40. Id. No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison).
41. Id. No. 48, at 343 (J. Madison). See also id. No. 71, at 460 (A. Hamilton) (comments
on the "imperious" nature of popular assemblies).
42. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 604 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
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separating the powers as a check on the legislature. 43 It prescribed in fine
detail in article I, section 7, the process of legislation and the presidential
veto power, making the President a strong but not controlling participant in
the lawmaking process.' The twofold purpose, according to Hamilton, was
to enable the President to defend himself against being "stripped of his
authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote," and
to furnish additional security against enactment of improper laws because of
the "effects of faction" or "want of due deliberation." 45
It has become fashionable to downplay the relevance of constitutional
text in separation of powers analysis, while giving lip service to the proposi-
tion that usages "cannot supplant the Constitution.' " The reason is not
hard to find. A substantial portion of the relative handful of separation of
powers disputes that have reached the courts have dealt with usages in areas
in which the Constitution concededly is more "open-textured'"' 47 than it is
concerning the congressional veto, such as presidential initiatives and pleas
of immunities or the constitutional status of the independent regulatory
commissions.
1. Presidential Initiatives and Immunities
An analysis of cases dealing with presidential initiatives and im-
munities indicates that despite some loose language it is premature to say
that anything goes, or that our system of separated powers has taken on the
outlines of the picture of Dorian Gray. If the presidential initiatives have
involved such matters as foreign relations, military affairs or national
security, where the clarity of article I, section 7 is lacking, the Supreme
Court admittedly has tended to augment the generality of the article II
clauses (dealing with the "executive power," and the President's "Com-
43. As noted by Judge MacKinnon in his dissent in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (1975),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), in which he deemed both the
method of appointment of the Federal Election Commission and the congressional veto in
respect to its rules to violate separation of powers: "The degree to which the powers must be
kept separate or may overlap depends in the final analysis upon applicable constitutional
provisions." Id. at 925 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
44. After a bill has passed both the House and the Senate it must be presented to the
President for his signature. If the President vetoes a bill during a session he must return it to the
Congress with a statement of his objections to it and the veto may be overridden by a two-thirds
vote of both houses of Congress. If during a session he fails to veto the bill within 10 days the
bill becomes law automatically. However, if Congress adjourns in fewer than 10 days after his
receipt of the bill, the President may veto it by simply failing to sign it (the so-called "pocket
veto"), and it is not returned to Congress. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 7, cl. 2.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 38, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton).
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
47. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 29 (1975).
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mander-in-Chief" and treaty-making roles4") by appealing to developed
custom and the inability of Congress to function on the front lines. 49 The
President has fared rather well. Familiar examples of such broad interpreta-
tions of presidential authority include the dicta of Justice Stewart50 and other
Justices in the Pentagon Papers Case,51 the similarly deferential statements
by the Court in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp. 52 concerning review of presidential authority in respect to licensing of
foreign air routes, and the grandiloquent language about presidential prima-
cy in foreign relations and military matters found in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 53 and the Prize Cases.54
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I & § 2, cls. 2, 3.
49. It is highly unlikely that we can successfully execute a long-range program for the
taming, or containing, of today's aggressive and revolutionary forces by continuing to
leave vast and vital decision-making powers in the hands of a decentralized, indepen-
dent-minded, and largely parochial-minded body of legislators ...
It is distasteful and dangerous to vest the executive with powers unchecked and
unbalanced. My question is whether we have any choice but to do so.
Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1961).
50. "For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States
possesses vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power [national
defense and international relations] than does, say, a prime minister of a country with a
parliamentary form of government." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,727-
28 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. 333 U.S. 103 (1974).
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legisla-
tive. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are
and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to
belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id. at 111.
53. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the
exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Id. at 319.
54. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized
but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept
the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the
hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a
war, although the declaration of it be "unilateral."
Id. at 668.
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing
an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such
alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belliger-
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If, however, the presidential initiatives involve the constitutional allo-
cation of powers for essentially domestic matters, a far stricter judicial
approach to separation of powers can be seen. Despite the backdrop of the
Korean War, the Steel Seizure Case was perceived by the Court as posing
an issue of allocation of domestic lawmaking authority between President
and Congress over labor-management relations. 55 Given this perception of
the issue,56 there could be only one answer. There was a statute directly on
ents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the
decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power
was entrusted.
Id. at 670.
55. Justice Jackson, concurring, said that when the President's power was not "turned
inward," but was "turned against the outside world for the security of our society," he would
indulge in "the widest latitude of interpretation" to sustain presidential authority. 343 U.S. at
645 (Jackson, J., concurring).
56. Other perceptions of the dimensions of the issues were possible. As Chief Justice
Vinson pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "Those who suggest that this is a case involving
extraordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary times. A world not yet
recovered from the devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another
and more terrifying global conflict." Id. at 676 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). The extraordinary
factors included the United States role in Korea, commitments to maintain international peace
and security under the United Nations Charter, assistance to Greece and Turkey under the
Truman Plan, and under the Marshall Plan and NATO in Western Europe. Id. at 668-69.
With differing perceptions of the setting come differing analyses of the case. According to
one commentator,
The doctrine of the case, as stated in Justice Black's opinion of the Court, while
purporting to stem from the principle of the separation of powers, is a purely arbitrary
construct created out of hand for the purpose of disposing of this particular case, and
is altogether'devoid of historical verification.
Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 64-65
(1953). Corwin concludes that the constitutional significance of the case is:
(1) That the president does possess "residual" or "resultant" powers over and
above, or in consequence of, his specifically granted powers to take temporary
alleviative action in the presence of serious emergency . . . .(3) It is also fairly
evident that the Court would never venture to traverse a presidential finding of
"serious" emergency which was prima facie supported by judicially cognizable facts,
but would wave aside a challenge to such a finding as raising a "political question." (4)
The Court would unquestionably have assented to the proposition that in all emergen-
cy situations the last word lies with Congress when it chooses to speak such last word.
And the moral from all this is plain: namely, that escape must be sought from
"presidential autocracy" by resort not to the judicial power, but to the legislative
power-in other words, by resort to timely action by Congress and to procedures for
the meeting of emergency situations so far as these can be intelligently anticipated.
Id. at 65-66. Compare Corwin's analysis to that of Kauper, who summarizes the potential
impact of the case as follows:
All agreed further that Congress by virtue of its legislative powers has the paramount
authority to prescribe procedures and programs to be followed in meeting an emergen-
cy situation of this kind; whatever authority the President may have by virtue of his
office is subject to legislative limitation. . . .Indeed, the case should serve as a
particularly valuable precedent in precluding an extensive interpretation of the Presi-
dent's autonomous military powers as a basis for executive control of the internal
economy when the country is not in a state of declared war and not threatened with
imminent invasion. Finally, the case shows a common area of agreement in that the
interpretations placed upon the President's powers are based on the language of the
Constitution, a common willingness to accept the premise that the President's powers
are delegated powers and that the President's actions must be justified on the basis of
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point, passed over Truman's veto, that not only failed to authorize presiden-
tial seizure to terminate a serious strike, but expressly authorized the
alternative tactic of seeking an injunction. In short, absent special article II
considerations, article I, section 7 prescribes the process for general law-
making within the substantive areas delegated to the national government in
article I, section 8.57
Similarly, in United States v. Nixon58 the Court hewed to the narrow
issue before it: which interest should prevail in a contest between a general-
ized claim of executive confidentiality with no overtones of foreign or
militaiy security, and a claim of specific need for certain information in
advance of a scheduled federal criminal trial? In rejecting the President's
claim to an absolute privilege in this context, the Court brought the judicial
branch into the separation of powers balance, saying that to allow the
privilege would be to "cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law
and gravely impair the basic function of the courts." 59 The Court did hold,
however, that executive privilege is constitutional in principle, and even
intimated that the privilege might be more weighty, or even absolute, if
military or foreign relations matters are involved.60 In short, in the Nixon
the grants of authority under Article II. The theory of inherent power in the conduct of
foreign affairs, advanced in the Curtiss-Wright case finds no echo in these opinions
dealing with presidential powers respecting internal matters.
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 Mim. L.
REv. 141, 174-75 (1952).
With the Corwin-Kauper insistence on the relevance of the constitutional text, when clear,
there should be little dispute, and it is this point that is most relevant to the issue of the
constitutionality of the congressional veto. The inference from their quoted language, that
when Congress speaks its word is final, must be set against the Justice Jackson hypothesis that
in some instances the President may prevail against express congressional opposition if his core
constitutional responsibilities under article 11 are implicated. 343 U.S. at 637, 640 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Recent Supreme Court support for the Jackson hypothesis concerning presidential
powers is found in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-96 (1974); see note 60 and
accompanying text infra.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The precision of the constitutional powers allocation in
question may be an element inducing judicial review. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969), the Court enforced express constitutional language prescribing the qualifications for a
congressman. It ignored arguments that on prudential grounds the dispute should be deemed
nonjusticiable because the enforcement involved judicial intrusion into the internal policing of a
sister branch. For cases involving interpretation and enforcement of legislative immunities, see
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
58. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
59. Id. at 712.
60. In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel urges two
grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to
our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of
communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiali-
ty is too plain to require further discussion. . . .The second ground asserted by the
President's counsel in support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine
of separation of powers. . ..
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case the judicial interest under article I in a fair trial was not counter-
balanced by any special concern founded in article II. Indeed, the article II
clause most nearly in point would be that mandating the President to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, ' 61 and that clause cut against the
President in this case.
The available Supreme Court precedents on presidential powers and
immunities suggest, therefore, that separation of powers remains a vital and
enforceable constitutional principle in such situations as United States v.
Nixon. There, insistence on an implied secondary authority of one branch
would have blocked a basic prescribed function of another branch. The Steel
Seizure holding further testifies very forcefully that as a matter of domestic
law, uncomplicated by national security considerations, the express alloca-
tion of lawmaking power in article I, section 7 to the Congress, subject to
an overridable presidential veto, exhausts the lawmaking possibilities in our
separation of powers system. 62 At the very least, such precedents indicate
that doubts about the constitutionality of the congressional veto device for
lawmaking and administrative direction cannot be lightly ignored.
2. The Independent Commission Movement
Expressions concerning the need for nonliteralism in approaching sep-
aration of powers are to be found in one other major area-the cases and
writings rationalizing the creation and operation of the so-called indepen-
dent regulatory commissions. As Justice Jackson noted, in an attempt to
validate these mixed power but "seemingly necessary bodies," their func-
tions have been called "quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judi-
cial.,"63 He observed that this " 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw
over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered
bed."64
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confiden-
tiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqual-
ified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum-
stances. . . Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
Id. at 705-06.
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
62. Such "lawmaking" includes the option, by statute, to delegate to administrative
agencies under appropriate standards the authority to make what the British call, with preci-
sion, subordinate legislation, i.e., rules and regulations. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971) (three judge court).
63. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 488.
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Unlike the situation with the congressional veto provision, however,
independent commissions do not contravene a number of highly specific
constitutional clauses concerning the proper role of Congress and its relation
to the administration of the government. 65 Neither do they produce an
intrusion of one branch into the core functions of another. The commissions
pose the kind of conceptual problem to which Justice Jackson referred only
if we engage in labeling, and try to find a bright line separating the
"legislative," the "executive" and the "judicial." The Constitution itself,
by its checks and balances principles, eschews any such bright line, 66 and it
has been judicially determined that the commissions do not impermissibly
intrude on the basic purposes of the separation of powers system. The
President's authority to appoint the members of the commissions may not be
compromised. 67 His removal power, however, may be limited under an
admittedly more questionable decision. 68 From this decision flows the real
problem with the commissions, one perhaps more political than constitu-
tional: integrating commission programs into an overall governmental pro-
gram in the interest of maximum cooperation and of efficiency in assign-
ment of functions. 69
B. Specific Constitutional Objections
The congressional veto in general may be subject to serious question
under at least the following major specific and significant constitutional
provisions or principles: (1) the provisions of article I, section 7, clauses 2
and 3,70 making the President a participant in the lawmaking process and
according him a veto power; (2) the allocation to the President in the "take
care" clause of article II, section 371-perhaps as augmented by article II,
section 1, clause 1,72 vesting in him the "executive power"-of the power
of execution of the statutes as enacted; (3) the firmly developed principle
that it is the function of the judiciary to interpret unamended statutes, and
most certainly to rule on questions of exceeding statutory authority; (4) the
65. See note 213 and text accompanying notes 70-77, 212 & 213 infra.
66. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 38 (J. Madison).
67. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-37 (1976) (per curiam).
68. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
69. See Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 AD. L.
REv. 1, 16 (1975) (suggesting the need for a Separations of Powers Commission "to make
recommendations to harmonize our present system with what the framers intended, democratic
theory expects, and the times required"). See also Byse, Comments on a Structural Reform
Proposal: Presidential Directives to Independent Agencies, 29 AD. L. REV. 157 (1977); Cutler &
Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
71. Id. art. 1I, § 3.
72. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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disability clause and incompatibility clause in article I, section 6, 73 which
separate members of Congress from administrative functions; and (5) the
appointments clause of article I1, section 2, clause 2,74 placing in the
President and not the Congress power to appoint administrative officials. In
addition, if the congressional veto device takes the mode of the one-house
veto, or the committee veto, rather than the less common mode of the
concurrent resolution, the bicameralism requirement for statute making and
statute modification set forth in article I, section 7 is violated.75
The bicameralism requirement is not to be lightly disregarded, for it
derives from the "Great Compromise" on state representation versus popu-
lar representation that made possible the Union. 76 It is not a sufficient
answer to say that because one house can block a proposal for new legisla-
tion, a one-house (or committee in one house) veto of administrative action
should likewise be constitutional.77 Such a one-house veto does not operate
to block new legislation under article I, section 7; it operates to block or
modify administrative power already created by an authorizing statute pur-
suant to operation of article I, section 7.
C. Veto Variables: Ultra Vires Grounds or Policy Grounds
How the constitutional inhibitions other than bicameralism are im-
plicated in practice may depend on the basis given for a particular exercise
of the congressional veto powers. 78 Suppose for example, that the Federal
73. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
74. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
75. Id. art. I, § 7. For tabulations of acts containing veto provisions by type of provision
see C. NORTON, supra note 11, at 9-12; Watson, supra note 11, at 1089-94.
76. For accounts of the political struggles between Federalists and Antifederalists, and
between large states and small states, see generally C. ROSSITER, 1787, THE GRAND CONVEN-
TION 185 (1966); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 553 (1969).
77. Congressman Drinan, in his views concerning the Reorganization Act of 1977, points
out:
The doctrine of bicameralism involves not merely the relationship between the
executive and the legislative branches, it also implicates directly the relationship
between the Federal legislature and the State governments, and the relationship
ultimately between the Congress and the people ...
This great compromise of 1787 is undermined by the one House veto because it
allows one House to act without the concurrence of the other in a matter of a
legislative nature. The Attorney General argues that bicameralism is preserved be-
cause each House has the opportunity to act upon the matter. That facile assertion
would appear to negate the clear procedural mandate of the clause in the Constitution
requiring affirmative votes in both Houses on matters involving legislative action.
H.R. REP. No. 105, supra note 27, at 42 (statement of Congressman Drinan). See also text
accompanying notes 221-27 (discussing the Salary Act Amendments that now require affirma-
tive action by both houses).
78. In Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v.
Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), discussed at text accompanying notes 171-93 infra, Judge
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Election Commission, which in Buckley v. Valeo79 already has been de-
clared to be an executive agency for the purpose of the presidential appoint-
ing power,80 should suffer a legislative veto of one of its rules because one
house of Congress thinks it is ultra vires, contrary to the intent of the
governing statute. So long as the authorizing statute remains unamended,
why would not such congressional action be an invasion of the law interpre-
tation function allocated to the judiciary? 81 In any event, would it be a
responsible way of proceeding?
On the constitutionality question it might be argued that the judicial
function is not being totally defeated, on the theory that in a subsequent law
suit the veto could be determined to be erroneous. Then the administrator
would be free to implement the statute under his initial plan.82 If such a
scenario developed, the price for the veto would be to impose only adminis-
trative delay in statutory implementation pending a judicial override of the
erroneous veto. The situation might be analogized to that under "report and
Leventhal, concurring, declined to reach the merits of the constitutional veto issue on ripeness
grounds, in part because he would deem it relevant to know the "reasons" given in an actual
instance of use of the veto, id. at 659 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
79. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
80. The Court concluded that the execution of certain powers granted to the Federal
Election Commission were in part merely in aid of legislative functions, but that most of the
powers granted to the commission (e.g., rulemaking, advisory opinions and the conduct of
administrative hearings) did not operate "merely in aid of Congressional authority to legislate."
Id. at 141. These powers could be constitutionally exercised only by officers of the United
States who were properly appointed by the President. Id. at 137-41.
81. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803). "The interpretation of
the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note
38, at 101 (A. Hamilton).
The Brief for the United States as Intervenor, Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), noted that the stated
purpose of inserting the congressional veto provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 209(b)(2), 408(c), 409(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); 26 I.R.C. §§ 9009(c), 9039(c)), was to
prevent ultra vires actions or, as phrased in the House Administration Committee report, "to
prevent the Commission from interpreting the Act in a manner inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent." H.R. REP. No. 917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). A statutory amendment to
disapprove a regulation would be valid, the Department of Justice said, but "the Constitution
commits to the Courts (through the judicial power to interpret the laws) to strike down [sic)
particular administrative regulations as being offensive to the statute, or the Constitution."
Brief for the United States as Intervenor, supra at 42.
82. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C.
1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), in which the court hypothesized a very special and limited
situation: that the provisions vetoed would be ones that the General Services Administration
Administrator thought essential on constitutional grounds to protect the confidentialities and
privacies associated with the former President's papers; that the regulation would then issue
without these vetoed provisions; that it would then somehow be successfully challenged in
court (presumably by Mr. Nixon on executive privilege or other grounds); and that the
Administrator would then be free to re-issue the regulations, including the provisions designed
to safeguard constitutionally protected interests.
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wait" provisions that impose a limited period of delay in carrying out
contemplated administrative action to provide an opportunity for the legisla-
ture to respond by legislation. 83 It has been suggested that such provisions
are harmless because they are merely supportive of the constitutional prima-
cy of Congress in basic lawmaking. 84
The analogy is inapt, however, because the delay under "report and
wait" provisions is in most instances limited to a specific time period, in
83. Most commentators on the legislative veto have distinguished between the constitu-
tionality of the full veto and "report and wait" provisions. The latter are thought to be
constitutional even by some persons opposed to the former. When advising the President to
veto an act containing a committee veto, Attorney General William Mitchell said, "No one
would question the power of Congress to provide for delay in the execution of such an
administrative order. . . ." 37 Op. Arr'y GEN. 56, 63 (1933).
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the "report and wait" provision in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). In Sibbach the challenged provision gave Congress a specified
time period to disapprove the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For other views not challenging
the constitutionality of the "report and wait" type of provision, see Cooper & Cooper, supra
note 11, at 470; Ginnane, supra note 11, at 577; Watson, supra note 11, at 1060. Although
Watson accepts the constitutionality of the "report and wait" provisions, he questions their
wisdom. He fears that Congress will exert too much informal pressure on the administrators,
thus creating a potent negotiation power. Id. at 1063. See also J. BOLTON, supra note 20, at 20.
Alan Morrison and Reuben Robertson do not comment specifically on the constitutionality
of provisions that merely delay implementation of executive actions, but they express reserva-
tions about the wisdom and practicality of delay. They presented a hypothetical colloquy
between an agency chairman and its general counsel to illustrate the problems caused when
additional time is allowed for congressional consideration after an already cumbersome agency
process.
[AGENCY] CHAIRMAN. What a great day! The Commission has finally reached
unanimous agreement on the airline overbooking rule, and voted to issue it at once.
GENERAL COUNSEL. We have been working on this for years, but it's worth it
because the rule is really a good one.
CHAIRMAN. The public has been very critical of us for not having dealt with this
problem years ago. Also there has been tremendous pressure on us from members of
Congress, demanding that we get the rule out.
GENERAL COUNSEL. Even the industry leaders want us to get done with the
matter.
CHAIRMAN. The Commission wants to get this into effect immediately. We must
give a specific effective date because the airlines need sufficient lead time to program
their computers. How soon can we put the rule ir force?
GENERAL COUNSEL. I don't know.
Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory Agencies: Hearings on S. 2258, S.
2716, S. 2812, S. 2878, S. 2903, S. 2925, S. 3318, and S. 3428 Before the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, supra note 22, at 167-68 (statement of Alan Morrison and Reuben
Robertson). For an actual example of the problems delay can cause, see the discussion of the
proposed Federal Election Commission regulations at issue in Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), discussed
at text accompanying notes 100 & 187 infra.
84. The most common type of review provision used by the states grants to the overseer
an advisory function only. Approximately 12 states have vested in a council or legislative
committee the power to review proposed regulations and submit recommendations to the
legislature for further action in the traditional legislative manner. See Legislative Improvement
and Modernization Committee, supra note 31. For an example of such legislation, see KY. REv.
STAT. § 13.087 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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order to avoid irresponsible congressional frustration of the administrative
process. More significantly, to make the argument that an ultra vires veto
should be as permissible as a "report and wait" provision, on the ground
that the veto is not necessarily final, is to presuppose that judicial review to
determine the erroneousness of the particular veto can be forthcoming and
prompt. 5 If Congress vetoes regulations imposing conditions on an expen-
diture program (for example, if Congress had vetoed HEW's Title IX86
regulations on sexual equality in school athletic programs 87), and if the
agency enforces the condition anyway and cuts off funds, then a private suit
raising the constitutionality of the veto is invited. The same potential joinder
of issue with a private party would occur if, despite a congressional veto, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration sought to enforce against a
private party a conduct regulation, or a regulation imposing a reporting or
data-gathering requirement. However, such reliance would place on a pri-
vate party the burden of investing time, effort and money to resolve an
intragovernment separation of powers dispute. It also would create legal
uncertainty. A specially authorized declaratory judgment procedure, to
review promptly the correctness of those congressional vetoes made on the
ground that the regulation is ultra vires, would be burdensome to the
judiciary and perhaps itself subject to attack on ripeness and prudential
grounds.88 If an ultra vires based congressional veto is deemed invalid if
85. For many years it was thought that problems of standing and justiciability would
preclude judicial review of the legislative veto device. Such considerations did prove fatal in the
recent attempted challenge by Ramsey Clark to the congressional veto in the context of Federal
Election Commission regulations. See Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), discussed at note 175 and
accompanying text infra. However, a ruling on the merits was achieved by the "judges suit"
in the recent Salary Act cases. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978).
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 17A. 1-.23 (West Supp. 1977),
contemplates judicial review by appropriate plaintiffs after the legislature has noted an objec-
tion to a submitted regulation. The objection cannot be on policy grounds, but must be on the
ground that the regulation is "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise beyond the
authority delegated to the agency." Id. § 17A.4. Under the Act the objection (unless it takes
statutory form) does not prevent the regulation from going into effect. It does, however,
operate to create a presumption that the regulation is "unreasonable" or ultra vires and places
the burden of proof on those issues on the state if litigation arises. Id.
Whatever may be the merits of the congressional veto device in the Iowa context, the
special feature of shifting to the state the burden of showing both that the regulation is not
unreasonable and is not ultra vires is questionable, given the realities of modern government.
Delegations of power are frequently made by legislatures in very imprecise terms. Despite the
demise of substantive due process, modern courts show increasing signs of a willingness to
substitute their own concepts of reasonableness for those of the administrators of a program. In
short, under the Iowa burden of proof shifting provision the plaintiff would win whenever proof
on either the issue of reasonableness or the issue of ultra vires was in even balance.
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975).
87. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1976).
88. See note 172 and accompanying text infra.
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final, its constitutionality can hardly be saved by the theoretical possibility
of a private law suit to reverse it.
Alternatively, the reason for a congressional veto may be grounded not
on an ultra vires judgment, but rather on dislike with the manner in which
the agency is proceeding within its delegated authority. The objection could
be to the substantive content of the regulation, the method of enforcement,
timing or the like. In a given instance a special interest simply may have
more "clout" with one house of Congress--or more realistically, with key
committeemen-than it has with the agency. The agency not only is backed
by the majesty of the executive branch, but is also subject to far more
stringent restrictions on exparte contacts than is Congress. 9 A congression-
al veto based on such "policy" grounds would avoid the interference with
the judicial function that is implicit in a veto based on ultra vires grounds. It
would, however, be in violation of other principles concerning the alloca-
tion of functions among the branches of our tripartite system. First, the veto,
in reality, changes the boundaries of the delegation. Congress is rewriting
the statute, engaging in basic lawmaking, in derogation of the President's
veto power. If it be a one-house veto, it also violates the principle of
bicameralism and avoids the bicameral internal check against parochialism.
In either instance there would be a sacrifice of the important purposes of
deliberation, representation of the whole country and political accountability
that are served by these constitutional provisions. Second, a veto on policy
grounds is a direct interference with the proper exercise of executive power,
in derogation of the article II allocation to the Executive of the responsibility
for executing the law.
D. Creation of an Extraconstitutional Negotiating Power
In another basic way the congressional veto upsets the constitutional
allocation of functions. A practical result of the veto power, whether or not
any vetoes actually occur, is to force on the agencies a negotiation process
"with teeth" as a condition of avoiding a threatened veto. In effect, the
personnel of the agency is involuntarily enlarged to include a new set of
powerful advisors not appointed by or controlled by the Executive, in
derogation of the Executive's appointment and removal power in article II.
As put in a Department of Justice brief in the recent sequence of litigation, if
the Congress cannot appoint executive officials directly, as the Supreme
89. In the agencies there is not only a custom of avoidance of exparte contacts, embodied
to some extent in agency conduct codes, but a mandate against ex parte contacts when the
rulemaking process is by formal hearing on the record. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(d)(1) (West 1977);
Employee Responsibilities and Conduct, 5 C.F.R. § 735.201a (1977).
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Court made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 9° it cannot indirectly appoint one
house as a "super-Executive" through the legislative veto device. 91
For example, in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
where the spread of the congressional veto device has been especially
rampant, 92 one program affected is the Office of Education's Basic Opportu-
nity Grants for college level education. 93 An eligible undergraduate may
receive up to half of his or her costs, reduced, however, by expected family
contribution for the year. The Office of Education must publish in the
Federal Register each year a schedule of expected family contributions for
the succeeding fiscal year for various levels of family income. Simulta-
neously, the Office must transmit the schedule to Congress for possible
negation under a one-house veto provision. There follows a sequence of
informal negotiation and formal hearings at the instance of the respective
House and Senate subcommittees, and in the House there has been a routine
introduction of a resolution of disapproval that is always finally tabled. 94
The functional result of such a review process is not to create significant,
ongoing administrative authority in the Congress or even one house thereof,
but in the key members of the relevant subcommittees-a membership by
definition nonrepresentative and subject to all the vagaries of periodic
realignment of subcommittee assignments. In this context the "congression-
al veto" can become more a "fiefdom" concept than a grand democratic
device for controlling the bureaucracy.
Other examples of the negotiating process in operation, seemingly
developing in each instance into frustration of statutory purpose, can be
found in the operation of the Federal Election Commission in respect to
promulgation of expenditure and recordkeeping rules for congressional
campaigns, and the General Services Administration in respect to promulga-
tion of rules for public access to former President Nixon's papers. 95 Judge
90. 424 U.S. at 124-36.
91. Brief for the United States as Intervenor, supra note 81, at 41.
92. S. Kurzman, supra note 30.
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (a)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
94. S. Kurzman, supra note 30. For example, the schedules for the academic year 1975-
1976 were published on July 2, 1974. Following negotiations and hearings the Senate subcom-
mittee chairman sent a letter of approval to HEW on October 3, 1974, and in the House the
resolution was tabled by the subcommittee on November 19, 1974. Id. See also Hearings on the
Family Contribution Schedule for the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program for Use in
Academic Year 1975-76Before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) (indicating that the subcommittee tends to press
for liberalization of the schedules).
95. Both operations are included in Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 30, at 1397-1403.
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MacKinnon, in his dissenting opinion in Clark v. Valeo,96 took note of the
negotiation process between the Federal Election Commission and members
of Congress, which became especially important after two different sets of
initial proposed regulations were vetoed in October 1975, one (filing rules)
by the House and one (financial disclosure rules) by the Senate. 97 That the
negotiation process "with teeth" was a congressionally intended element of
the congressional veto provision, and not a concealed by-product, is evi-
denced by comments of Congressman Anderson at the time of the House
veto. He referred to a failure of an attempted "compromise revision"
between the Commission and a House commmittee, the committee's "pre-
rogatives and jurisdictional rights in the process involved," and the need for
a "healthy working relationship" between the Commission and the commit-
tee.98 Thereafter the Commission, as reconstituted with solely presidential
appointees after Buckley v. Valeo, 99 deferred the proposal of new regula-
tions until early August 1976, despite the imminence of the November 1976
election, in order to give key legislative aides time to make substantial
revisions. The matter ended with a whimper, with no regulations in force
when Congress adjourned on October 2, 1976. Although almost sixty
calendar days had elapsed, only twenty-eight legislative days had elapsed,
and the statute specified a thirty-day opportunity for a congressional veto.100
A similar sequence of unsuccessful negotiation, presentation of pro-
posed rules, congressional veto and indefinite postponement of achievement
of regulations to implement the statute has occurred in regard to the
rulemaking function of the General Services Administration under the Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. 01 As noted in the
Supreme Court's opinion rejecting arguments that the Act was facially
invalid, and not reaching any issue of the validity of the rulemaking process
or its prospective content, three sets of proposed regulations had been
vetoed over a two-year period and the GSA Administrator was working on a
fourth set. 102
At the level of constitutional analysis, is the strong negotiating power
created by the congressional veto any different from other, accepted forms
96. 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977).
97. See id. at 679 n.2, 687 n. 17 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
98. 121 CONG. REC. H10186 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975) (remarks of Representative John
Anderson).
99. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
100. See 559 F.2d at 666 (Robinson, J., dissenting); id. at 679 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., dis-
senting).
101. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974); see 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (Supp. V 1975).
102. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). A fourth set of regula-
tions was finally put into effect in 1977. 41 C.F.R. § 105-63 (1977).
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of strong congressional influence over the Executive? It is possible to
muster support for an affirmative answer because "it is a constitution we
are expounding,"'' 0 3 and the Constitution speaks here with considerable
clarity. Under article I, section 7, after Congress has delegated power the
administrator can resist congressional influence until a two-thirds majority
in both houses can be achieved to override a presidential veto of a statutory
amendment (or repealer) that takes away or modifies the delegated power in
question."0 4 Under the congressional veto device, however, congressional
influence can become controlling when a bare majority of a quorum in one
house can be mustered. To be sure, the bicameral two-thirds requirement of
article I, section 7 may seem harsh, but any such objection must be
addressed to the Constitution directly and does not support the constitution-
ality of the congressional veto device to shift the constitutional power
balance between the President and Congress.
Arguments derived from the appropriations process also do not create a
constitutional foundation for the congressional veto. By threats of no fund-
ing, or under-funding, policy may be influenced, but this is within the
"power of the purse" expressly given to Congress by the Constitution.
Indeed, it is reinforced in two ways: revenue measures must originate in the
House of Representatives,105 which was the only body directly elected by
the people until the Senate was placed under popular election by the
seventeenth amendment in 1913; and military appropriations may not be for
a longer term than two years.106 Further, as Judge MacKinnon has observed,
"the normal congressional relationship" with the Executive, including the
appropriations process, "acts in futuro;" there is not "any immediate
iptervention" in executive exercise of a statutorily authorized power. 0 7
E. Delegation of Powers Problems
Congressional veto provisions are sometimes perceived to pose prob-
lems under the delegation of powers doctrine. They operate as a delega-
tion 108 of significant dispositive power to certain members of Congress
without a trace of a standard I°9 either to guide their discretion to negate a
103. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
105. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
106. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
107. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d at 682 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
108. One three judge district court has referred to the one-house veto as a "delegation by
Congress to each House." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 338 n. 17
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The issue was raised specifically by plaintiff in Clark
v. Valeo.
109. The stated purpose sometimes included as part of the veto provision, i.e., to deter-
mine whether the regulation is ultra vires because it exceeds the scope of the statute, is not a
"standard"; it is an intrusion on the judicial function. See note 81 supra.
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particular executive action or to provide a basis for "meaningful judicial
review." 110 Arguably, there is an improper delegation in two respects: first,
delegation to an improper recipient; and second, delegation without stan-
dards to guide the discretion to make subordinate legislation.
Even though the rule that private persons are improper recipients of
delegated power has lost much of its initial precision,111 members of
Congress acting under a congressional veto provision, and thereby sharing
powers with administrative officers of the United States, would seem to be
improper recipients because of the combined operation of three separation of
powers clauses in the Constitution. The disability and the incompatibility
clauses in article I, section 6 evince a clear purpose to separate the process
of legislation per se from the process of administration per se. The disability
clause specifies that "during the time for which he was elected," no
member of Congress shall be "appointed to any civil office under the
authority of the United States, which shall have been created. . during
such time." 112 The incompatibility clause provides that "no person holding
any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during
his continuance in office." 113 The third relevant clause is the appointments
clause of article II, section 2, clause 2,114 which makes no provision for
appointment of officers of the United States by Congress, and which was
construed in Buckley v. Valeo to require presidential appointment of all
members of the Federal Election Commission. 115 When the members of one
house veto the work of that Commission it plausibly could be asserted that
they are in reality, if not technically, in form, exercising the Commission's
delegated powers over the subject matter.
For Congress thus to delegate administrative power to itself by a
congressional veto provision violates not only the general principle of
separation of powers, but all three of these specific implementing clauses
relating to administrative "offices." As Madison put it in The Federalist,
110. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759
(D.D.C. 1971) (upheld delegation of authority to the President to establish wage and price
controls).
111. See Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND.
L.J. 650, 650 (1975).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
113. Id.
114. [H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115. 424 U.S. at 143.
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after quoting Montesquieu's warning against allowing the legislative and
executive powers to be "united" in the same person or body, "where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles
of a free constitution are subverted. '116 When commissions or Cabinet
agencies engage in rulemaking and likewise "administer," there is no
"uniting" in the "same hands" of the "whole power" of two branches of
the government in the Madisonian sense because the Congress, by statute,
always can reshape or take back the delegation. However, when Congress
enacts a statute, and then delegates to itself (or a part of itself), through a
nonstatutory process such as the congressional veto, the power to have final
control over the administration of the statute, there is the kind of forbidden
union of power in the "same hands" that the Framers feared and that the
three constitutional clauses relating to administrative "offices" were de-
signed to prevent.
Some problems exist in attacking the congressional veto on the second
improper delegation ground-the more frequent "no standards" objection.
To be sure, it could be argued that even the cases upholding very loose
delegations to the Executive have something to point to in the nature of a
standard, even if it is little more than an instruction to pursue the "public
interest" 117 in the context of the particular area of regulation. The congres-
sional veto provisions, however, are on their face standardless. The rebuttal
would be that the members of Congress possessed of congressional veto
power are to second guess the agency, using the same statutory standards the
agency used. Thus, if the standards were sufficient to validate the initial
delegation to the agency, they should be sufficient to validate the redelega-
tion to members of Congress. In effect, standards can be viewed as being
"read into" the congressional veto provision. To the extent that such a
rebuttal is persuasive, the "improper recipient" argument becomes stronger
than the "no standards" argument in respect to delegation of power
concerns raised by the congressional veto.
Apart from conventional constitutional analysis, the delegation to
Congress (or a subgroup therein) that is implicit in a congressional veto
provision may warrant more concern than a similarly loose or unguided
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 38, at 331 (J. Madison).
117. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970) (the FCC may renew licenses "if the Commission
finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby"). See also New
York Cent. See. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) (leasing of one carrier by another is
permitted if in the public interest); International Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 264 App. Div.
506, 36 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 830, 47 N.E.2d 435, 43 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1943)
(contracts subject to approval by Public Service Commission if in the public interest).
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delegation to an executive agency. The agencies, at least as to activity of a
rulemaking nature, operate subject to the strictures of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires a consultative and rationalized decisional
process.118 Agencies, in addition, may have potentialities for formal self-
limitation of discretion not transferable to the political arena in Congress. 119
By contrast the congressional process, being political in the sense of "popu-
lar," and properly so, works by compromise and adjustment and is, from a
jurisprudential standpoint, basically an irrational process. That is the es-
sence of basic democratic policymaking, but it is inappropriate for the
administrative process of developing the needed subordinate legislation for a
program. For one house of Congress to intrude by a veto power into the
latter process raises a specter of spasmodic, partial, unrationalized, inex-
pert, nonrepresentative program development, and thus reinforces the wis-
dom of the article I, section 7 disposition and the bicameral principle.
F. Due Process and Equal Protection Limitations on Congressional Intru-
sion Into Agency Action
Absent some specially egregious fact situation, such as a specific
interference with a personal interest, or intentional discrimination between
persons similarly situated, neither due process nor equal protection require-
ments are likely to be violated by the exercise of the congressional veto
power. Indeed, if such an egregious fact situation should arise, the more
appropriate clause would be the bill of attainder clause, if the effect of the
action could be said to penalize a specific person or group. 2 0
Plaintiffs did plead both due process and equal protection viola-
tions in Clark v. Valeo. 121 The effect of subjecting proposed regulations of
118. Agency rulemaking normally follows either the notice and comment provisions or the
formal hearing- provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 553, 556, 557
(West 1977). In addition, the basis for agency action, even if informal, must be sufficiently
rationalized to be understandable, if not credible, to the reviewing court. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Secretary of Transportation may be required to
supply reasons for approval of highway through park in the absence of formal findings that
there was no alternate route). See also NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264 (1956)
(agency definition upheld as being in accord with both common usage and specialized usage in
the area of labor relations); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (inadequacy of information from industry held insufficient basis for final administrative
determination against industry).
119. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1971); Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969).
120. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (statute barring payment to specified
government employees who were subjects of congressional investigation held unconstitution-
al). But see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (termination of benefits to deported alien
pursuant to a general statute upheld).
121. 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977).
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the Federal Election Commission to a one-house veto process, they argued,
was to allow self-interested incumbents to control rules that would affect
their future reelection campaigns in violation of due process restrictions on
bias in decisionmaking. 122 There are at least two difficulties with this
argument. The first is that factors of self-interest are present, but necessarily
tolerated, in the conventional statute-making process, too (for example,
"Pork Barrel" legislation for home districts). Even if this difficulty is
surmounted by pointing out that the one-house veto device escapes the
salutory checks of bicameralism and the presidential veto, the second
difficulty is that the strongest anti-bias precedents relate to officials exercis-
ing adjudicatory powers, rather than legislative or rulemaking powers. 123
There are two or three precedents that frown upon the exercise of congres-
sional influence in a particular administrative proceeding. However these
cases turn on the fact that congressional contact was unauthorized, 124 or
operated before the agency made an adjudication 125 or a decision having
adjudicatory aspects. 126
The basis for the equal protection argument in Clark was that nonin-
cumbent candidates like Ramsey Clark are disadvantaged by having less
access to the Commission to obtain favorable rules than incumbent candi-
dates, and certainly less "clout," because only the latter can threaten a
veto. 127 As already noted, 128 however, there are circumstances in the
conventional legislative process in which incumbents may have more clout
on matters affecting them personally than do outsiders: decisions by statute
for equal public funding of incumbents and challengers even though incum-
bents have a built-in advantage in their office staff; and budgets for "offi-
cial" mailings and trips to their constituencies. 129
122. See id. at 645 n.20.
123. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (barring professional organization's board
members from deciding license revocation proceedings from which they could benefit); Ward
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (disapproving a mayor's power to fine traffic
violators); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
124. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) (decision to construct bridge held invalid because of undue
pressure from members of Congress).
125. Pillsbury Co. v. FrC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (congressional committee hearings
challenging FTC's conduct of a pending divestiture case constituted a denial of due process).
126. Sangamon Valley TV Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (private
approaches to FCC members vitiated agency's allocation of channels).
127. 559 F.2d at 645 n.2.
128. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
129. Without the trigger of a fundamental right or a suspect category, court review of
alleged improper classifications is confined to ascertaining that the classification has minimum
rationality. See Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest
Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89; Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality:
Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
494 (1977); Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
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G. Justifications of the Congressional Veto: "Conditional Legislation"
Concept
Most justifications for the congressional veto either consist of argu-
ments against taking separation of powers very seriously in modern Ameri-
ca, 130 or confuse the congressional veto with the many legitimate kinds of
oversight that neither run afoul of specific clauses in the Constitution nor
seek to legalize a "shared administration" concept.' 31 More specific justifi-
cations include attempts to make a very expansive interpretation of the
"necessary and proper" clause of article I, section 8 which is discussed
below in connection with the recent litigation, 132 and the "contingent
legislation" concept.
The contingent legislation concept is a sub-aspect of the delegation of
powers heading. Historically, in the early era when courts took the purist
separation of powers view that "Congress cannot delegate legislative power
to the President, ' 133 one escape device that allowed validation of some
delegations was to say that the legislature itself had made the policy and had
merely conditioned its application on an executive finding that specified
circumstances existed. On this basis the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark134
sustained a tariff act that allowed the President to shift certain imports from
a duty-free to a, fee schedule whenever he found that the exporting country
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Quaere, if justiciability hurdles
could be overcome regarding judicial review of internal processes in Congress, could the equal
protection plea be, bolstered by arguing that a more stringent judicial review test should be
applied here because the alleged adverse impact on the political process is analagous to
tampering with a fundamental right?
130. One version of this approach attempts to use the independent regulatory commission
experience and cases, see text accomphnying notes 63-69 supra, as a basis for a general
leniency, even subordinating the specific constitutional clauses that suggest some clear lines of
division. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 69; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1031. Cutler and
Johnson have suggested a plan to give the Executive more control over the actions of indepen-
dent agencies through Executive orders directing some aspects of agency action. They include a
one-house veto of these Executive orders on a pragmatic-basis, to secure the necessary support
in Congress for their proposal. Cutler & Johnson, supra at 1414-17. On the constitutionality of
the veto Cutler had this to say:
The order itself would be subjected to a one-house veto, if we have to have a one-
house veto to get the proposal enacted. My own view about the one-house veto is that
at least in some areas, if it isn't constitutional it ought to be. . . .It is a very different
proposition if carried to excess, but it has a practical virtue in today's age when it is so
difficult for the Congress to legislate policy statute-by-statute against a background of
crises that keep changing almost monthly. I have a hunch that the founding fathers,
given today's problems, might have thought that was a fair practical solution of this
kind of a problem.
Symposium, supra note 22, at 706 (statement by L. Cutler).
131. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 11. See also text accompanying notes 105-07 supra
(the appropriations power).
132. See note 266 and text accompanying notes 265 & 266 infra.
133. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
134. Id.
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was not treating our products with reciprocal fairness.135 On the basis of
such cases it has been urged that the congressional veto is likewise constitu-
tional as simply another variety of precondition, specified in advance, to the
effectuation of a delegated power. 136 This argument-which amounts to
saying that because Congress can choose not to legislate at all, it can attach
any condition or contingency it wishes to the execution of a statutory power
delegated to the executive-is a teasing half-truth, as the literature on the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions demonstrates. 137
Conditions precedent to administrative execution of statutory powers
may be of several kinds: for example, a wholly objective event, such as a
flood, which triggers disaster aid; a finding of "fact," as in reciprocal tariff
legislation or as in arms embargo legislation; 138 or a free option to be
exercised by a third party, perhaps one affected by the potential policy, as in
some agricultural legislation. 139 Some conditions precedent, though nomi-
nally factual, may be distinctly judgmental, as in the reciprocal tariff or
arms embargo situations. In the first instance the President must assess
business conditions, and in the second instance must calculate what balance
of forces contributes to peace. In such situations if would be an intrusion on
the President's article II authority to execute statutorily delegated power for
Congress to add, as a "second contingency," that the President's judgment
concerning a particular tariff or embargo will be ineffective if blocked by a
congressional veto.
Currin v. Wallace,14° which is sometimes cited as precedent support-
ing the constitutionality of the congressional veto on a contingent legislation
theory, can be distinguished from the judgmental condition precedent situa-
tion. There the Secretary of Agriculture was given power to designate
auction markets and inspect tobacco to be offered there, but only if the
affected farmers voted for such a program. In effect, the Secretary acquired
no statutory authority to act until the farmers voted affirmatively in the
135. For more recent examples, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05
(1943); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,407 (1928). As the complexity
of the "findings" or "contingencies" increased, the courts had to admit that policymaking
power was being delegated after all, and judicial inquiry shifted to the question whether the
legislature had provided sufficiently precise "standards" to guide the administrative discretion.
See text accompanying notes 116 & 117 supra.
136. Cooper & Cooper, supra note 11, at 475-76.
137. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Pivilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
138. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
139. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1 (1939).
140. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
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referendum. The referendum (the contingency) therefore operated on the
statute, and not on an administrative determination already made. In up-
holding the statute the Supreme Court made this point clear: "[Tihe re-
quired referendum does not involve any delegation of legislative authority.
Congress has merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by with-
holding its operation as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of the growers
voting favor it.' ",141
The statutory scheme in Currin did not involve an exercise of dele-
gated law enforcement discretion by the Secretary as to whether the public
interest as defined in the statute required an inspection, followed by a
reversal vote in the farmers.' 42 That would be a different case. Even if a
statute of this latter type were upheld, 14 3 the congressional veto device
would not thereby be validated. A court decision to allow congressional
delegation of power to private groups on grounds so unstructured yet
conclusive, however bad as public policy, involves in constitutional terms
solely a question of delegation doctrine. No other constitutional considera-
tions come into play. Such a ruling could furnish no constitutional warrant
for the quite different situation that is reached when, by a congressional veto
device imposed on administrative authority, the Congress tries to blur or
wipe out the constitutional prescriptions of article I, section 7 (regarding the
scope of the congressional role in policymaking), and of article II (regarding
the role of the Executive in executing statutes). The only exception to the
constitutional ban on displacement of executive judgment, regarding what is
needed for effective implementation of a statutory purpose, is court review.
Even that does not operate on a substitution of judgment principle, or at least
141. Id. at 15.
142. Likewise, in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), there was no question of congressional
interference with the exercise of a delegated authority. Rather, the question was whether the
standard (or triggering condition) to start the administrative implementation of the statute was
precise enough. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
143. Such a validation apparently occurred in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307
U.S. 533 (1939), in the heyday of the reaction against the old nondelegation doctrine. Yet the
Court's opinion, written by newly appointed Justice Reed, will not withstand critical scrutiny.
In order to uplift the milk industry the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to define milk
marketing areas and propose marketing orders, the key feature being minimum price scales for
producers (farmers). The marketing order, however, could go into effect only if agreed to by
50% of the handlers (middleman purchasers from farmers), or if two-thirds of the farmers voted
to foist it on the handlers and the public. The latter occurred, over handler opposition. Id. at
556. In the course of a 42-page opinion primarily discussing the factual record, Justice Reed
devoted only half a page to the constitutionality of the contingent legislation feature. He cited
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939), and without discussion simply said: "[W]e must assume
that Congress had the power to put this Order into effect without the approval of anyone.
Whether producer approval by election is necessary or not, a question we reserve, a require-
ment of such approval would not be an iqvalid delegation." 307 U.S. at 577-78.
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should not. Rather, courts ask whether: (1) The action is within delegated
authority; (2) has a rational basis in light of the discretion conferred; or (3)
violates constitutional rights.144
H. Inappropriateness of the British Analogy: The "Laying" System
Although not directly relevant to constitutional questions raised by the
congressional veto, the British "laying" system merits brief mention be-
cause it is offered by some proponents of the congressional veto as another
justification for it.145 Under the British system some "subordinate legisla-
tion," (for example, rules and regulations to implement statutory authority),
does not go into effect for a prescribed period, usually forty days, to permit
its presentation to Parliament for either express approval or "approval" by
nonaction. 146 There are significant limitations on the practice. Apparently
fewer than half of the various actions constituting subordinate legislation are
laid before Parliament, 147 and the limited grounds authorized for con-
sideration by the scrutinizing parliamentary committee (for example, unusu-
al or unexpected use of statutory powers and imposition of a charge on the
public revenues 148) do not include a policy review.
In the view of one participant in the system, it is only the exclusion of
policy review that has enabled the parliamentary committee to process its
business with dispatch; indeed, this exclusion has produced "remarkable
harmony" in the scrutinizing committee even though the chairman may be a
member of the Opposition.1 49 In short, the system deals primarily with
subordinate issues in subordinate legislation, and does so in nonpolitical
fashion. The occasional successes reported concern matters of minor impor-
144. See notes 81 & 118 supra.
145. Schwartz, supra note 5; Symposium, supra note 22, at 680 (statement of Congressman
Levitas).
146. For a general description see J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRA-
TiVE LAW 83-99 (2d ed. 1957); H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313-14 (1967). The submissions
are reviewed by the House of Commons' Select Committee on Statutory Instruments (Scrutiny
Committee).
147. Carr, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: Parliamentary
Supervision in Britain, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1955).
148. H. WADE, supra note 146, at 319-20.
149. The chairman, by what is becoming a convention, is a member of the Opposition,
so that it need not be feared that he is under any temptation to protect the Govern-
ment's subordinate legislation from criticism. Consideration of policy being excluded,
remarkable harmony prevails; on no occasion as yet has the chairman needed to take a
vote.
Carr, supra note 147, at 1054. Carr notes that after World War II it was suggested that the
Scrutiny Committee's task include policy review, but this proposal was rejected in order to
maintain the more streamlined review that is possible only when policy matters are excluded
from consideration. Id. at 1051. See also H. WADE, supra note 146, at 319, who reports that
because the focus is on "questions of form rather than substance" the Scrutiny Committee
does its work "without party strife."
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tance and may consist of the department concerned voluntarily agreeing to
make modifications in response to a meritorious remonstrance on a matter of
form or technique. 150 It is reasonable to hypothesize, however, that if the
congressional veto were to be modeled along the lines of the limited and
nonpolitical British "laying system," its proponents (in Congress at least)
would not be even remotely satisfied.
On institutional grounds as well the "laying system," whatever effect
it may have as a parliamentary control device in Britain, cannot be intellig-
ibly fitted into the American separation of powers system. Despite an
occasional fillip in the House of Lords, the British system is essentially a
one-house system; therefore, the special problem of the "one-house veto"
in the context of a bicameral deliberative body cannot arise. More im-
portantly, in Britain there is no executive separate from the Parliamentary
majority, and no executive veto power. Realistically viewed, there is little
functional distinction between House of Commons' policymaking by major-
ity vote, which produces a statute, and House of Commons' policymaking
by majority vote or majority silence, which may block or bring into being
"subordinate legislation."
H. THE CONGRESSIONAL VETO IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROGRAM CONTrXT
The constitutionality of the congressional veto received its first full
dress briefing, and at least partial judicial reaction, in the sequence of
litigation in 1976 and 1977 arising out of the Federal Election Commission
statute (Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.11), the Postal
Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967152 and the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation (Nixon Tapes) Act of 1974.153 The courts in the
Tapes Act litigation, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,154 barely
touched the congressional veto issue, thus the veto issue in that statute
remains open for the future. The Salary Act litigation raised the issue only in
150. See H. WADE, supra note 146, at 320-21; Carr, supra note 147, at 1055. The House of
Lords may participate in this method of supervision (except in financial legislation) but British
constitutional custom would deter the Lords from rejecting the Government's subordinate
legislation "if a political crisis was thereby precipitated." Id. at 1056.
151. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5,
18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
152. Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,5,22,
28, 31, 38, 39, 40, 44 U.S.C.). In 1977 the veto provision was amended so that both houses must
affirmatively approve salary proposals. See Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, § 401a, 91 Stat. 39 (codified at2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (West Supp. Pamphlet
No. 1 1977)).
153. Pub. L. No. 93-56, 88 Stat. 1695; see 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (Supp. V 1975).
154. 433 U.S. 425 (1977), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976), discussed at note 82
supra.
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the context of quadrennial salary adjustments for high officials, and in
Atkins v. United States15 5 the Court of Claims sustained the congressional
veto. In that limited context the veto may be isolable, and valid, as "reverse
legislation," rather than intrusion on executive discretion. 1
56
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) litigation, Buckley v.
Valeo 157 and Clark v. Valeo, 158 raised the issue of constitutionality in its
most critical context-congressional interference with an ongoing adminis-
trative program under statutorily delegated authority. Under the statute the
FEC's implementing regulations must be submitted to Congress, and either
house may nullify them by majority vote within thirty legislative days. 159
Both Buckley and Clark also illustrate the difficulty in achieving judicial
review of the congressional veto, a matter worthy of some inquiry because
major systemic shifts in power balance can result from nonreview 160 as well
as from innovative and authoritative judicial constructions of the Constitu-
tion.
A. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley the initial version of the FEC statute was held unconstitu-
tional under the appointments clause of article 11,161 and the Court was able
to sidestep the congressional veto issue. 162 Although the veto issue was
implicit in one of the questions certified by the district court to the court of
appeals, that court treated it as one of the questions not yet ripe for review. It
thus could view the FEC at that stage as "a constitutional legislative agency
that performs primarily legislative functions."'16
3
155. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978), discussed at text
accompanying notes 221-50 infra.
156. See text accompanying notes 239-50 infra.
157. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
158. 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977).
159. 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(c)(1),(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
160. Our federalism structure, as well as our separation of powers structure, offers exam-
ples of such power shifts, semi-sanctified by judicial silence. The vast system of federal grants-
in-aid to the states, under which consent is bought for a variety of federal standards, has been
exempt from full-dress judicial review of its intrinsic validity ever since the Court held that
neither a state nor a citizen had standing to challenge this exercise of congressional power.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). A later case upheld a federal rule that federal aid
monies could only be handled by nonpolitical officials, but sloughed off, in typical Justice Reed
fashion, the large federalism issue. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127 (1947). On federalism implications, see Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare
State, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4 (1964).
161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, quoted in note 114 supra.
162. 424 U.S. at 118-43. The members of the FEC were held to be officers of the United
States, so that the provision for appointment of some FEC members by the Congress was a
violation of the appointments clause. Id. at 125-26.
163. 519 F.2d 821, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see id. at 889, 891 n.183.
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A similar approach was taken in one of the two briefs that the Attorney
General, in an unusual move, filed in the appeal to the Supreme Court. In
one brief for himself as a named defendant and for the FEC, the Attorney
General performed his customary role of defending a statute. He discussed
public funding of elections and first amendment issues, but did not reach the
separation of powers issues concerning the FEC's law enforcement authority
and the congressional veto. 164 In a second brief for himself and for the
United States as amicus curiae, the Attorney General argued that if the FEC
had law enforcement powers they would be unconstitutional as an invasion
of executive powers because the Commission majority was appointed and
controlled by Congress.165 Similarly, the congressional veto would be sus-
pect. These warning "dicta" were softened, however, by the suggestion
that since the FEC had not. yet sought to exercise any law enforcement
authority, the separation of powers issues were not "ripe.'" 166
Plaintiff Buckley, not inhibited by the institutional considerations that
pressed on the Attorney General, pushed for a decision on the merits and
asserted: "Vesting veto power in Congress is just as unconstitutional as
vesting an appointment there."' 67 In any event, the Court agreed that
Congress was not just shadowboxing and that it did intend to confer
enforcement power on the FEC. The Court therefore reached the separation
of powers issue and held the FEC to be unconstitutional because the manner
of its appointment did not comply with the appointments clause of article
11.168 It saw no need at that point to reach the congressional veto issue,
referring to it as "the most recent episode in a long tug of war between the
Executive and Legislative Branches . . respecting the permissible extent
of legislative involvement in rulemaking under statutes which have already
been enacted." 16 9 Justice White, however, offered a cryptic dictum support-
ing the congressional veto concept. 170
B. Clark v. Valeo
After Congress had responded by 'providing for presidential appoint-
164. Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission.
165. Brief for the Attorney General As Appellee and for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 116-19.
166. Id. at 108-09. It should be noted that in the same month, October 1975, in which these
briefs were filed by the Attorney General, the House and Senate in separate actions exercised
the congressional veto against two different sets of regulations proposed by the FEC. See text
accompanying note 97 supra.
167. Brief of the Appellants at 208 n.9.
168. 424 U.S. at 118-43.
169. Id. at 140 n.176.
170. Id. at 284-85 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see note 210 and
accompanying text infra.
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ment of all voting members of the FEC,171 the attack on the retained
congressional veto provision was continued by Ramsey Clark in 1976 in his
capacity as voter and as candidate for the Democratic nomination for United
States Senator from New York. Because of the impending primary election,
Clark v. Valeo was hastened to argument on a shortened briefing schedule
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc on
September 10, 1976.172 After Clark lost the primary election on September
14, 1976, the case was held back until January 21, 1977, at which time it
was dismissed.' 73 The Supreme Court without comment affirmed the dis-
missal on June 6, 1977.171
The court of appeals offered a melange of considerations for the
dismissal. The per curiam opinion for the court rested on lack of ripeness. 175
There was no ripeness in respect to Clark because in his sole remaining
status as a voter he had shown no inhibition of his political activities flowing
from the Act on the face, apart from any specific implementation. Further,
he had protested "no specific veto action taken by Congress and identified
no proposed regulation tainted by the threat of veto on review." 176 The
quoted point intimates that as a voter he had only an abstract interest in
constitutional integrity and thus intertwines ripeness and standing issues.
171. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
172. The judicial review provisions, found in id. § 437h, require the district court to certify
all constitutional questions presented to it to the court of appeals for en banc consideration. The
decisions of the court of appeals on matters certified are reviewable by direct appeal in the
Supreme Court if the appeal is brought within 20 days of the lower court decision. Both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court are required to "advance on the docket and expedite to
the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter certified." Id.
In Clark the court of appeals received the certified questions from the district court on
September 3, 1976, and ordered the hearing for September 10, 1976. See 559 F.2d at 644-45.
173. Id.
174. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) (mem.). Thus the "merits" of the dispute about
the constitutionality of the congressional veto continue to evade Supreme Court consideration,
whatever the significance to be derived from this summary affirmance in respect to the
"ripeness" doctrine on an article III basis or prudential basis. Because of the varying views in
the five opinions produced by the court of appeals sitting en banc, it would seem that very little
significance would attach to the affirmance even if the dispute about the precedential value to
be accorded summary actions in the "appeal" process is resolved in favor of according them
binding effect. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam) (summary affirmances
prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented);
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (holding that lower court erred in disregarding a
summary dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 671 (1974) (holding that summary affirmances do not have precedential value equal to full
Court opinions). See also Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Signifi-
cance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REv. 373 (1972).
175. 559 F.2d at 647. The court did not reach other issues such as the political question
consideration and standing, i.e., whether Clark had continued standing at least as a voter after
failure of his candidacy, and whether the United States as intervenor had a continuing juris-
dictional basis if Clark should be dismissed.
176. Id.
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There was no ripeness as to the United States which, as intervenor, was
directly asserting an interest in the constitutional integrity of separation of
powers, because Congress had not yet exercised the veto in respect to any
regulation submitted by the post-Buckley reconstituted FEC.177
Concurring Judges Tamm, Bazelon and Wright agreed that there was
lack of ripeness. They also would have held that the United States as
intervenor lacked independent standing to "challenge the actions of one
branch of the federal government as an unconstitutional invasion of the
powers of another branch," 178 because there was neither statutory authoriza-
tion nor an "articulated injury to an interest of the federal government as a
whole."' 17 9 They did suggest that the President might have standing in
respect to interference with his veto power, 180 but presumably he too would
be subject to a ripeness dismissal until the Congress actually exercised its
veto by blocking a specific administrative action. Concurring separately,
Judge Leventhal agreed with the ripeness dismissal of Clark, but would
have preferred to base it on "prudential" or discretionary grounds 181 rather
than on article Im grounds as the majority apparently intended.
Surely the Clark majority's insistence on an actual congressional
exercise of its supposed veto power as a precondition of avoiding a manda-
tory ripeness dismissal on article M grounds cannot be the last word on this
branch of the law. This approach egregiously misconceives the true nature
of the congressional veto in operation. It overlooks the extraordinary
"negotiating power"-different from other legitimate kinds of congres-
sional influence over administrative action-that the congressional veto
vests in Congress. 182 This negotiating power is illustrated by the factual
record in Clark itself,183 and by studies of the operation of the congressional
veto device (whether or not "exercised") in other programs. 184
Apart from the negotiating power question, the Clark majority's posi-
tion is blind to the possibilities for congressional maneuver in the so-called
"exercise" of the veto power. The subtlety of the "exercise" concept also
is illustrated in Clark itself 185 by the experience of the FEC, as reconstituted
177. Id. at 649.
178. Id. at 654 (Tamm, Wright, J.J. & Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 654 n.l.
181. Id. at 657-64 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
182. See text accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 96 & 97 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
185. See 559 F.2d at 666-67 (Robinson, J., dissenting); id. at 680-82 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting).
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after Buckley,186 in attempting to devise implementing regulations in the
face of the congressional veto provision in the statute. The FEC delayed
submission of the regulations to permit further time for "negotiation."
After submission in early August 1976, Congress stretched the statutory
provision for thirty "legislative days" of consideration into almost sixty
calendar days, and managed to adjourn on October 2, 1976, with only
twenty-eight "legislative days" accumulated. Thus, the regulations were
barred without need for an actual vote "exercising" the congressional veto
power.187 It would be an odd system of jurisprudence in which "ripeness"
was allowed to depend on such chance factors largely within the control of
Congress. The effect would be to deny "ripeness" to all possible challenges
to the congressional veto in the last two calendar months of a congressional
session-perhaps for an even longer time if Congress were clever about its
work scheduling. It would be the kind of circumstance "capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review" that the Court has not allowed to defeat justiciabil-
ity in other areas of the law.188
More intellectually satisfying reasons for the dismissal in Clark are the
discretionary prudential considerations that dominated Judge Leventhal's
opinion: for example, the desire to have a "full-bodied record" 189 before
reaching a previously unlitigated separation of powers issue. Such an ap-
proach would not allow Congress indefinitely to play "ducks and drakes"
with constitutional law.
Approaching the question of ripeness from a somewhat different per-
spective, which sub silentio may go part way to prejudging the merits,
Judges Robinson and MacKinnon deemed irrelevant the key consideration
of the majority-that Congress had not yet exercised its power to disapprove
FEC regulations. To them, the case raised "a purely legal issue," 190
because Clark as a voter was alleging two immediate harms inhering in the
186. Even if the two actual exercises of the congressional veto in October 1975 to block
FEC regulations are disregarded because those regulations emanated from the pre-Buckley
unconstitutionally appointed Commission, this earlier experience demonstrates that "exercise"
of the veto power is a real and not a remote possibility. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
187. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
188. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
189. 559 F.2d at 662-63 (Leventhal, J., concurring). As to the point about the lack of a "full-
bodied" record in Clark, it should not pass without notice that one reason for that situation was
the refusal of the defense to brief the one-house veto issue in the court of appeals proceedings.
They placed all their eggs in the jurisdictional-justiciability basket. See note 81 supra. For the
majority to then use this defense-counsel-caused inadequacy in the record as one basis for
dismissal seemed to Judge MacKinnon, who dissented on the dismissal issue, to border on
constitutional chutzpah: "This is the first instance to my knowledge where a court has elevated
such conduct on the part of a defendant into a jurisdictional defect." 559 F.2d at 694 (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting).
190. 559 F.2d at 672 (Robinson, J., dissenting); id. at 690 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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congressional veto from the outset. One was the delay, amply documented
in this case, in implementing the policy and protections of the statute
because of the negotiation process the veto power induced and the power of
Congress to put proposed regulations into limbo by timely adjournment. The
other was the "taint" 191 that will inhere in the regulations because of the
veto-induced influence Congress will have on the FEC's deliberations-
Congress becoming a "working party"' 192 in the functioning of the agency.
Although Judge Robinson, unlike Judge MacKinnon, indicated he was not
reaching the merits, 193 the taint argument, at least, would be difficult to
square with the separation of powers doctrine when the merits are reached,
if that doctrine is to have even moderate force.
C. Constitutionality of Congressional Veto of Administrative Action in
Light of Buckley and Clark
The essence of what is wrong with the congressional veto in a situation
such as the FEC regulation of campaign finance practices, and in respect to
the many other administrative programs to which the veto device has been
attached, 194 is that it subjects program administration to a continuous proc-
ess of consultation with some members of Congress. Because the latter are
in a position to have the last word, the veto becomes, in reality, a "sign-
off" process rather than mere consultation. Members of Congress, more
accurately, certain key committeemen in Congress and their staff aides, thus
acquire power without responsibility. Their interventions can be selective
and spasmodic; virtually never is the entire Congress responsibly involved.
The veto intrusions, and veto-inspired sign-off intrusions, are not confined
to major rulemaking actions but include a wide variety of administrative
decisions, as the HEW experience in particular illustrates.19 5
This is not to suggest that either the practical administrative problems
or the question of constitutionality would vanish if an attempt were made to
confine the congressional veto to "rulemaking." Rulemaking is a process
whereby an administrator charged with developing and operating a regulato-
ry or service program can formulate regulations of general application, and
thus give prospective notice to those affected. The alternative is a series of
individualized actions whereby policy is clarified in the process of being
191. Id. at 672 (Robinson, J., dissenting); id. at 679 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 679 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 662 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
194. See text accompanying notes 18, 92-95 supra.
195. Some examples of the types of HEW activities that are subjected to congressional
veto control are the issuance of guidelines for state equalization programs, the implementation
of special experimental projects and the abolition or consolidation of advisory councils. S.
Kurzman, supra note 30.
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applied, and hence may have retroactive effect in the particular application.
There is not, however, a clear line between these two modes of operating, 196
as indicated by the longstanding difficulty, not to say confusion, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) regarding the definitions of "rule"
(official action of a generally prescriptive nature) 197 and "order" (official
action of a particularly prescriptive nature). 198 Further, when both modes of
proceeding are statutorily authorized, as is the case with many programs, it
is established law that the administrative body has discretion to proceed by
"rule" or by "order" in policy development. 199 The latter mode of operat-
ing, of course, is like a common law process. In such situations a congres-
sional veto provision may be counterproductive insofar as it operates to
induce an agency to opt for the more hidden and retroactive adjudicatory
mode of policy development by "order," instead of the more open and
prospective mode of policy development by the rulemaking mode. 200
Seemingly sensitive to some of these difficulties of categorization,
Judge Leventhal in Clark intimated some thoughts on the constitutionality
of the congressional veto, and hypothesized what might be called a "shared
196. If "rulemaking" were easily separable from the ongoing process of administration it
could be handled in Congress at the outset by the statutory mode, without any need for
delegation. Indeed, whenever possible that mode of policymaking should be followed, and the
delegated scope of administrative discretion correspondingly narrowed. When this is not
possible delegation, of course, must occur. At this point article II calls for separation, but only
until the delegation is pulled back or modified by a new statute.
197. "[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, ap-
pliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or
practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). There is presently before the Senate Judiciary Committee an amend-
ment to the APA, S. 1721, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 CoNo. REC. S10,159 (daily ed. June
20, 1977), which would remove the ratemaking phrase from the definition of rule, and set out a
separate definition of ratemaking. The definition of "rule" would also be amended to remove
from it the words "or particular." These two changes, supported by both the American Bar
Association and the Administrative Conference of the United States, would help to clarify the
distinction between "rule" (general) and "order" (specific). CoNo. REC., supra at S10,163-65.
198. "'[O]rder' "means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing .... 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
199. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). See also NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
200. On the tendency of an agency, even without the veto inducement, to resist exercising
rulemaking authority, and thus to limit its own discretion in respect to future actions, see
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of
Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 63 (1973); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking orAdjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921
(1965).
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legislative power" argument. After noting that delegation of legislative type
power to the Executive has been deemed constitutionally acceptable, he
wrote:
If the particular regulation by an executive official or execu-
tive-appointed agency reflects delegation of what is in substance
legislative power, the question arises why the legislature may not
provide instead that when exercising legislative rulemaking power,
the agency is "an agent of the Congress" and the delegation of
legislative power is conditioned on at least modest concurrence of
the executive-appointed initiator and of the legislative branch. The
American Constitution accommodates hybrids that work. E.g., the
Comptroller General is appointed by the President (with Senate
consent. . . but he conducts auditing for the Government "as an
agent of the Congress". ...)201
The short answer to the question he raises, and pro-legislative veto conclu-
sion he infers, is that it well illustrates the point he had just made (that
reaching the merits should await a thorough briefing). It is still a "constitu-
tion we are expounding," and as to the congressional veto there is some
very specific constitutional text to be dealt with-unlike the case of validat-
ing independent regulatory commissions 2 --that does not lend itself to a
"hybridization" slough-off. Nor is the example he mentions, the Comptrol-
ler General, supportive of the constitutionality of the congressional veto.
The Comptroller, through the General Accounting Office, conducts auditing
but does not engage in the kinds of law enforcement pursuant to public law
that so engaged the Supreme Court's attention in Buckley v. Valeo.
203
In constitutional terms Judge Leventhal's suggestion apparently is
based on the view that a statutorily delegated power to engage in rulemaking
remains "legislative" in the article I sense. Hence, even though the dele-
gatee is an article II official appointed by the President (as required for the
FEC in Buckley), he concurrently is an "agent of Congress." 204 As such he
201. 559 F.2d at 664 n.13 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
202. See text accompanying notes 63-69 supra.
203. 424 U.S. at 140-41. The occasional exceptions to this statement, for example, the
function of administering the 1971 Federal Election Campaigns Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3 (repealed 1974), before it was replaced with the 1974 Act, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat.
613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 22, 28, 31, 38, 39, 40, 44 U.S.C.) (which
transferred the functions to the FEC), have gone unlitigated and perhaps have been unconstitu-
tional.
204. See text accompanying note 201 supra. The "agent of Congress" phrase, like the
prefix "quasi," which eases the process of fitting the regulatory commissions into our constitu-
tional order, conceals confusion. In our system all three branches can be characterized as
"agents" of the people, but there can be no interbranch agency, in the full sense of the term, in
a separation of powers system.
Powers can be delegated by Congress to executive agencies and delegations may be
terminated. Unlike a true agency, however, Congress cannot interchange roles with the ad-
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must come into "at least modest concurrence" 205 with Congress when he
exercises the delegated rulemaking power.
The opposing view is that even though the power is "legislative" in the
constitutional sense when it remains in congressional hands, it becomes
"executive" in the constitutional sense once it is delegated. Article II then
attaches, including both the President's appointing power, which the Su-
preme Court expressly vindicated in Buckley, and his obligation to "take
care" through his agents that the laws be faithfully executed. 2°6 That the
"take care" obligation, as well as the "appointments clause," has a
transforming effect, so that legislative-type powers once delegated are no
longer strictly "legislative," seems also to find some support in the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Buckley in respect to the FEC:
All aspects of the Act are brought within the Commission's broad
administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions, and deter-
minations of eligibility for funds. . . . Congress viewed these
broad powers as essential to effective and impartial administration
of the entire substantive framework of the Act. Yet each of these
functions also represents the performance of a significant govern-
mental duty exercised pursuant to a public law. While the President
may not insist that such functions be delegated to an appointee of
his removable at will . . none of them operates merely in aid of
congressional authority to legislate or is sufficiently removed from
the administration and enforcement of public law to allow it to be
performed by the present Commission. These administrative func-
tions may therefore be exercised only by persons who are "Offi-
cers of the United States."207
In the foregoing discussion there is a fair amount of "labeling" in the
quotations on both sides of the argument. The central substantive point,
rising above labels and forms of legislative action, must be that the separa-
tion of powers principle was intended to effectuate a basic separation of the
administrative process, in which "rule" and "order" cannot be separated
effectively from the legislative process. At least, such separation is required
unless a principled and thus self-limiting basis for some "hybridization"
can be articulated. The congressional veto may be specially rationalized in
ministrators without violating the "same hands" prohibition of the separation of powers
doctrine, see text accompanying notes 32-42 supra, nor can Congress fully control the process
of appointing and removing the recipients of delegated power. At best there is what might be
called-horrors!-a quasi-agency.
205. See text accompanying note 201 supra.
206. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 & § 3.
207. 424 U.S. at 140-41 (emphasis added). This opposing view was also embodied in the
Court of Claims in the dissenting opinion of Judge Skelton in Atkins v. United States: "Once
made, such a delegation of power to adjust salaries becomes an executive power, and it remains
such until and unless legislation is enacted (by both houses) withdrawing it." 556 F.2d at 1080
(citation omitted) (Skelton, J., dissenting).
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the contexts of the Salary Act and the Reorganization Acts, for the very
reason that an administrative process in the core sense is not being inter-
fered with.208 This is not the case with the FEC or executive branch
programs generally.
On a doctrinal level the opposing view to the Leventhal construct
seems to be more in accord with the unique American separation of powers
system. As applied to a conventional agency possessed of rulemaking
powers, Leventhal's view proves too much. It would be a long step toward
converting our presidential government into a ministerial government with-
out at least three significant, central accountability components of the
British parliamentary system: (1) tight party discipline in the House of
Commons under the Prime Minister; (2) unicameralism, in essence if not in
form; and (3) the tradition that Parliament cannot go beyond questioning the
Minister to intrude on day-by-day administration. 2 9 Without these compo-
nents the congressional veto, which has no principled limits, can produce a
scattered, irresponsible control from the congressional committees upward.
It can displace the centrality of administrative control and direction that is a
feature both of the parliamentary system through the Prime Minister and the
American system through the President, and that enables pinpointed politi-
cal accountability. Although Judge Leventhal has hypothesized that the
congressional veto may produce a beneficial and "modest concurrence"
between the executive rulemaker and Congress, the reality is that the
congressional veto is a final negative on the administrator's attempt to
implement a statutory authority that has not been modified by regular
statutory process.
An even more forthright dictum by Justice White in Buckley v. Valeo
in favor of the congressional veto antedated Judge Leventhal's teasing
208. See text accompanying note 216-19 infra.
209. In Great Britain the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, enforced
through a question period, produces the reality of strong civil service autonomy and indepen-
dence. The doctrine is augmented by the Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 2,
which imposes criminal penalties on all unauthorized disclosures of information acquired in the
course of official duty. As observed in H. WADE, supra note 146, at 17-18: "The cabinet system
with its parliamentary majority provides a firm front against which the tides of public criticism
surge and break, and behind which the civil service shelters." Administrators are not sum-
moned by Parliament to testify and bring papers. The powerful congressional committee
structure does not have a counterpart in Parliament; instead, the British on occasion make use
of commissions of inquiry, outside the legislature. See R. CHAPMAN, THE ROLE OF COMMISSIONS
IN POLICY-MAKING 174-75 (1973); G. RHODES, COMMITrEES OF INQUIRY 107 (1975).
In addition, of course, there is the reality that the so-called "laying system" for presenting
subordinate legislation (rules and regulations) to the Parliament for review produces few
changes above the cosmetic level. In the parliamentary system such a presentation is a
presentation to oneself, up to the point when a government "falls" over some far larger issue
than subordinate legislation. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
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dictum in Clark. Justice White's dictum also well illustrates the dominant
theme of the Clark majority that decision of such a novel, institutional issue
should await full briefing and a "full-bodied" record. Justice White sought
to analogize the one-house veto to the power of either House, when operat-
ing in the conventional article I, section 7 mode for legislating, to block a
proposed statute:
[B]ut for a regulation to become effective, neither House need
approve it, pass it, or take any action at all with respect to it. The
regulation becomes effective by nonaction. This no more invades
the President's powers than does a regulation not required to be
laid before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive
content of agency regulation may be enhanced, but I would not
view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to
legislation or to an order, resolution or vote requiring the concurr-
ence of both Houses. 210
Whether or not the congressional veto ultimately is deemed constitu-
tional, its validity cannot be convincingly supported by the approach in
these quoted lines. The approach is not responsive to the way the congres-
sional veto operates in practice, for it does not recognize that the influence
over prospective regulations created in key members of Congress by the
mere existence of the veto provision may permeate the administrative
process. Furthermore, to say that once submitted a regulation becomes
effective by "nonaction"-and hence is no more an invasion of presidential
powers than if never submitted-is not responsive to what actually hap-
pened in submission of proposed regulations by the initial FEC. After a
sequence of committee reports and procedural motions, final votes were
taken on the veto question. A majority was mustered in the House against
one regulation, in the Senate against another. 211 Had the votes gone the
other way these regulations would have become effective by the action of
not mustering a majority.
More importantly, the votes on the question of disapproval of sub-
mitted regulations, however they come out and whether under a one-house
or two-house veto provision, are congressional actions on the shaping of
public law. As such, they must be fitted into the constitutional scheme
delineated in articles I and fl; yet no ready pigeonhole can be found. From
one perspective the votes on proposed regulations are analogous to the
210. 424 U.S. at 284-85 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). From this
dictum, and the silence of the other Justices, Judge Leventhal derived further support for his
vote for a prudential dismissal of Clark v. Valeo. 559 F.2d at 664 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
The White dictum was subjected to lengthy critical analysis by Judge MacKinnon, the only
judge in Clark to squarely reach the merits. Id. at 685-90 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
211. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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executive (Article II) process of implementing delegated authority. That,
however, would be a clearly unconstitutional intermixture of powers. Nei-
ther can the veto actions be fitted into article I, because what actually is
happening is that Congress is making new public law by modifying an
extant scheme of delegated power. For this reason, despite Justice White's
contrary statement, the veto action falls under article I, section 7, clause 3-
the "second presentment clause' '21 -- which the Framers inserted to ensure
against an evasion of clause 2, which deals with presentment of formal
bills.213
In larger perspective it must ever be borne in mind that these specific
clauses in the Constitution are supportive of a separation of processes-
specifically, the separation of what we now call the administrative process
from the legislative process. The separation principle is rooted as well in the
intent of the Framers2 14 and as a core concept in our system is accepted even
by those who seek to justify some "modest" hybridization. The administra-
tive process is subject, to be sure, to legislative authorization and direction
by statute, but that too is limited by the President's defensive veto power.215
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
213. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. James Madison was primarily responsible for the inclusion of the
"second presentment clause." He observed "if the negative of the President was confined to
bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions, votes &c-proposed
that or resolve should be added after 'bill' in the beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to
votes of adjournment &c." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911). After an initial vote of rejection, the clause met with approval when it was
resubmitted by Mr. Randolph. Id. at 301-05. See also Symposium, supra note 22, at 687-88
(statement by A. Scalia).
214. See text accomanying notes 36-47 supra.
215. As Hamilton obseried, because of the "propensity of the legislative department to
intrude upon the rights" of the other departments, a "primary inducement to conferring [the
veto power] upon the Executive is, to enable-him to defend himself," for otherwise "the
legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands." THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 38, at 468-69 (A. Hamilton). In somewhat puzzling fashion, this
is turned around by Justice White in Buckley to yield the comment that the President's veto
power, while giving him an important role in the legislative process, was not considered by the
Framers to be an "inherently executive function." 424 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). By such labeling, room would be made for conferring a veto power on
the Congress, too. Would not that miss the important point that the presidential veto was
designed not only to protect some vacuum labeled the Presidency, but also was to be supportive
of the larger separation of powers principle that Congress should not intrude on the administra-
tive process? Years ago, in a quite different era (1885), Woodrow Wilson also remarked on the
propensity of Congress to bring about a "scheme of congressional supremacy." W. WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 28 (1885, reprint 1956). We all
know that by the time he assumed the Presidency the power balance had shifted; but the
important point to be derived from his 1885 work is that in remarking about congressional
supremacy he deplored both its impact on abstract separation of powers theory and its practical
results. The potential for a major transformation of our system by vigorous use of the
congressional veto has been noted by two of its supporters who concede that "the veto
conceivably could be used to deliver the executive completely or substantially into the hands of
Congress." Cooper & Cooper, supra note 11, at 505.
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The administrative process cannot maintain its operational integrity as
intended under the separation of powers principle if it is subordinated to
sublegislative interventions by a congressional veto device not provided for
in the Constitution and antithetical to its basic structure.
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL VETO IN THE "DISCRETE
LEGISLATION" CONTEXT
Whether or not there is a constitutional distinction, there is an observ-
able programmatic and interbranch relationship distinction between use of
the' congressional veto to intrude on the operation of a continuous and
evolving administration program216 (of which Buckley and Clark are our
closest, almost-litigated examples), and its use in somewhat discrete and
narrow ways to change the law on a given point. The distinction is espe-
cially clear if the latter category is conceptualized as being confined to
matters that are (1) conventionally and simply dealt with by statute, and (2)
self-executing once the "law" is made, that is, which do not create, or act
216. Further clarification of the constitutional power of Congress to interfere in the
administration of on-going programs may be forthcoming from the decision of an appeal
pending in the Ninth Circuit, Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., appeal docketed,
No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1977).
Chadha has appealed a congressional veto of an administrative determination to suspend
his deportation pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (West 1970
& Cum. Supp. 1977). The Attorney General has statutory authority to suspend the deportation
of any alien who meets certain statutory qualifications, but must report the action to the
COngress for possible veto by either house. Id. § 1254(c) (West 1970). Chadha was granted a
suspension of deportation, but the House of Representatives vetoed the suspension of Chadha
and five others after reviewing 340 cases. Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
at 5-6. Chadha is supported in his attack on the veto by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) on the ground that the veto is an intrusion into the administration by the INS of
consistent policies. Id. at 12.
In Asimakopoulos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971),
when a departmental hearing officer (immigration judge) refused to grant a suspension, citing as
his rationale a congressional committee report explaining its position in the exercise of prior
vetoes, the Ninth Circuit held that such reliance on congressional action was an abuse of the
judge's statutorily granted discretion to suspend deportations. Id. at 1363. The immigration
veto power poses special problems in light of Asimakopoulos. If permitted Congress may,
through a series of vetoes, attempt to establish a policy of narrowing the grounds for the
suspension of deportations. The agency may then attempt to respond to the congressional gloss
on its original delegation by cooperating in this constriction in order to avoid vetoes.
Asimakopoulos seems to say that the veto may not thus be used to alter the scope of the original
delegation. If the administrative agency must continue to decide cases in accordance with the
initial delegation, only to have the cases vetoed in Congress, an impasse could result.
As is more likely, Congress will not establish a clear policy through the exercise of its veto,
but rather will merely create uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the original statutory
delegation. If this is the case the immigration judge will not be able to rely on congressional
pronouncements, and will not be subject to attack for failure to exercise his discretion.
However, the existence of the veto power and the knowledge of past vetoes may serve to create
a potent negotiating power in Congress, or to alter the scope of administrative discretion in
ways that may not be subject to judicial challenge because the change is not made explicit. For
a further discussion of the negotiation power, see text accompanying notes 90-107 supra.
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on, administrative discretion to operate a governmental program. One prime
candidate for inclusion in such a special category is the quadrennial revision
of the pay rates for Senators, Representatives, federal judges, high execu-
tive officials and certain others under the Federal Salary Act of 1967217 as
recently amended.218 Another candidate would be the sequence of Reorgani-
zation Acts dating from 1932, under which the President is authorized to
make certain kinds of relocations of administrative machinery and functions
in the interest of vigor and efficiency-an authority recently renewed for
President Carter. 219
The argument for the constitutionality. of the congressional veto in such
a limited range of matters would be enhanced if a bicameral response to the
executive submission were required and a selective or "item" veto were
prohibited. In such an instance the label "reverse legislation" could be
applied because the constitutional parity of the President and Congress
under the lawmaking provisions of article I, section 7 would not be
impaired. Atkins v. United States,"0 brought by a number of federal judges
under the Salary Act and decided by the Court of Claims in May 1977,
comes very close to being just such a case. On the merits the court sustained
the one-house veto provision as exercised under the Salary Act in the case
before it. The opinion is congenial to a "reverse legislation" concept
although not squarely based on it.
A. The Salary Act and Atkins v. United States
The Salary Act of 1967221 was a response to the twin realities that
members of Congress hesitate to vote for a salary increase for themselves-for
fear of political repercussions, and that the salaries of federal judges and
high executive officials can move upward only in tandem with congressional
salaries. In an effort to depoliticize the issue and to have periodic increases
to keep pace with inflation be more automatic, the Act created a Commis-
sion on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries, which at four year
intervals is to recommend to the President pay rates for such officials. On
the basis of this information, the President is directed to include in his next
budget message his own recommendation, to become effective thirty days
217. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 22, 28, 31, 38, 39, 40, 44 U.S.C.).
218. Federal Salary Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, 91 Stat. 45 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§
358-360 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977)).
219. See notes 15 & 27 supra.
220. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978).
221. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 22, 28, 31, 38, 39, 40, 44 U.S.C.).
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after submission unless one house of Congress disapproves, in whole or in
part. 2
22
The Salary Act litigation arose because President Nixon's salary in-
crease recommendations, submitted in February 1974, were vetoed in their
entirety by Senate resolution. Atkins v. United States,223 which became the
leading case, was filed for 140 federal judges, while other suits were filed
by plaintiffs in the other two branches of the government.224 The basic
theory of Atkins was to treat the Salary Commission as valid, and reach the
golden egg of the 1974 increases225 by voiding and treating as severable the
one-house veto provision. Although the question has never been raised,
because it was not in the interest of the plaintiffs to do so and because no one
else has tried, it may be noted that the goose (the Commission) is in
distinctly poor health. As a mixed membership commission,226 not all
appointed by the President with senatorial confirmation, unless its advisory
status gives it immunity, it may be afflicted with the same disease that the
Supreme Court found fatal to the initial Federal Election Commission in
Buckley v. Valeo.227
Atkins had an unusual litigative history. At the outset, the brief of the
Department of Justice for the United States as defendant 228 did not squarely
join issue with the contention of former Justice Goldberg, counsel for the
judges, that the one-house veto was unconstitutional. Rather, it tried to
finesse the issue. It was argued that the veto provision was inseverable, so
that even if unconstitutional the judges would take nothing; and that if it
were deemed unconstitutional but severable, the court's order should be
prospective only in order to give Congress an opportunity to respond.229 In
222. Id. § 225(i) (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970)) (amended 1977). The 1977
amendment to the Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977), discussed in note
152 supra, not at issue in this case, may have eased the minds of some judges because it met
bicameralism objections by requiring that both houses approve a salary recommendation before
it can take effect, even though it left standing the selective veto objection.
223. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978).
224. See, e.g., McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977); Pressler v. Simon,
428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated per curiam sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S.
169 (1977) (congressional salaries). On remand, the district court reinstated its dismissal of
plaintiff's claim in Pressler; the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of lack of standing. 98 S.
Ct. 758 (1978) (mem.).
225. While the suit was pending the 1976 increases were achieved when Congress failed to
disapprove them within 30 days. See Salary Recommendations for 1977 Increases, 2 U.S.C.A. §
358 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 10,297 (1977).
226. The Salary Commission is composed of nine members, three appointed by the Presi-
dent, two by the Speaker of the House, two by the President of the Senate and two by the Chief
Justice. 2 U.S.C. § 352 (1970). Its function as advisor to the President seems to be a convention-
al executive function.
227. 424 U.S. at 140-43.
228. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Petitions.
229. Id. at 14, 23.
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oral argument, however, the Court of Claims understood the Government to
admit that the one-house veto provision was unconstitutional, and noted that
the Government had taken a similar position in a concurrent proceeding in
the court of appeals in Clark v. Valeo.23° The court itself then took the
initiative to enlarge the proceeding by inviting amici curiae briefs from the
Senate and the House of Representatives, both of which were already
involved with the one-house veto issue in Clark.231
After keeping the case sub judice for months, the Court of Claims,
splitting four to three on the constitutionality of the one-house veto in this
context,232 dismissed the case on May 18, 1977. Two additional issues in
the case were: the propriety of the Court of Claims' entertaining the case at
all, since like all federal judges they would benefit personally from a
decision for the plaintiffs; and an inflation-discrimination argument that the
congressional refusal to raise judicial salaries in the face of severe inflation
was a diminution of "compensation" in violation of article 11, section 1.233
230. 556 F.2d at 1058. In Clark, the United States, through Assistant Attorney General Rex
Lee, and Clark through his attorneys, Nader associates Alan Morrison and Larry Ellsworth (an
interesting pair of bedfellows !) did file briefs listing many of the constitutional objections to the
one-house veto device. Brief for Plaintiff; Brief for the United States as Intervenor, supra note
81.
231. The letter requesting briefs from the Senate and the House noted that the Department
of Justice had admitted the unconstitutionality of the veto provision in the Act. The Depart-
ment's position on the nonjusticiability of the claim, the inseverability of the veto from the
statute and the prospective applicability of the salary increases were all brought to the attention
of Congress. The court then invited the House and Senate to file briefs within 30 days. Both
houses responded to the invitation and submitted briefs supporting the congressional veto.
Letter from the Clerk of the Court of Claims to Carl Albert, Speaker of the House and Nelson
Rockefeller, President of the Senate (Oct. 14, 1976).
232. The issue of the constitutionality of the congressional veto remains close, despite the
inscrutable dictum of Justice White in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 284-85, quoted at text
accompanying note 210 supra. This lack of understanding is indicated not only by the four to
three vote in Atkins and the narrowness of the issue, see text accompanying notes 239 & 248
infra, but by the record of the court of appeals sitting en banc in Buckley and Clark. For those
who like to play the dangerous game of predictions based on inferences, it may be hypothesized
that in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia three or possibly four of the eight-
judge bench have tipped their hand as being at least deeply concerned about separation of
powers. Only one, Judge Leventhal in Clark, has intimated support for the congressional veto.
559 F.2d at 659 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon expressed direct opposition to
the veto in both Buckley, 519 F.2d at 932 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), and Clark, 559 F.2d at 685-90 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); Judges Tamm and Wilkey in
Buckley expressed sensitivity to separation of powers issues and, unlike the majority, would
have reached and nullified the nonpresidential appointment of the initial FEC, 519 F.2d at 920-
21 (Tamm & Wilkey, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Judge Robinson in Clark
inferentially expressed similar sensitivity in the course of his ripeness discussion detailing the
immediacy of the harms to Clark flowing from the "inevitable effects of its [congressional veto]
operation in any context." 559 F.2d at 666 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
233. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
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The propriety problem, on which the Court of Claims had unsuccessfully
sought enlightenment from the Supreme Court earlier,2 34 was resolved by
the "rule of necessity" because there was no other forum not personally
involved.235 The inflation-discrimination argument, although supported by
some startling data on disparity of treatment, 236 was rejected by construing
article HI, section 1 as barring only an "assault upon the independence of
the third branch, '"237 shown by an intentional plan or gross neglect. The
record showed only political cowardice rather than a punitive spirit against
judges, and that others besides judges were adversely affected. 238
The Court of Claims' majority opinion on the congressional veto issue,
here a one-house veto, did not conceptualize a possible "reverse legisla-
tion" category, but did note that the Salary Act itself posed the issue in a
very narrow context. 239 Its favorable holding, therefore, does not support
the constitutionality of the congressional veto in general. The opinion,
however, is so loosely structured that selective quotation from it could yield
some support for an across-the-board validation of the congressional veto.
Five factors were seen as dominant but two were merely truisms about
congressional power,24° and two were parochialisms about the congressional
234. The question certified to the Supreme Court asked: "[A]re the judges of the Court of
Claims required to disqualify themselves in these cases, or does the 'doctrine of necessity'
authorize and require the judges of the Court of Claims to hear and decide these cases." 556
F.2d at 1035-36. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court dismissed
the question without comment or opinion. Atkins v. United States, 426 U.S. 944 (1976) (mem.).
235. 556 F.2d at 1035-39. The court took this position after discussing the statute, the Code
of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association adopted by the Judicial Conference and
earlier cases such as those relating to claims of judicial immunity from the income tax. Id.
236. During the period from 1969 to 1975, when the salaries of the federal judges remained
unchanged due to the exercise of the veto, the cost of living increased 34.4%. This meant that
the judges purchasing power decreased accordingly, from $40,000 to $26,200. The salaries of
most government employees were increased by 36.5%, and the salaries of starting government
lawyers were raised 59.32%. Members of the armed forces received more than twice their
former level of pay, and the Congress raised the size and salaries of its own staff and increased
its own allowances. Id. at 1033-34.
237. Id. at 1045.
238. Quaere: Even absent a punitive spirit against judges, could all adversely affected
groups mount an equal protection attack, alleging unreasonable classification? Would a court
reject it either by concluding that absent a specific article III, § 1 claim the dispute was a
political question, see id. at 1051-54, or by finding no basis for applying more than a minimal
rational scrutiny, thereby concluding there was adequate rationality because pay scales were all
that Congress felt the public would tolerate? For a discussion of legislative classification, see
Barrett, supra note 129, at 122-30; Dixon, supra note 129, at 525-33; Gunther, supra note 129.
239. The only "one-House veto" we have before us is that contained in section
359(l)(B). The only instance of its use that is before us occurred in S. Res. 293, which
disapproved the whole of the President's recommendations. We are not to consider,
and do not consider, the general question of whether a one-House veto is valid as an
abstract proposition, in all instances, across-the-board, or even in most cases.
556 F.2d at 1058-59.
240. The first two factors deemed significant were: that the pay setting function has
traditionally been exercised by the Congress and is an intrinsically legislative concern; and that
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heart's desire.24 Only the last flushed out a significant consideration:
"[T]he President's salary proposals, even when they become law, do not
order or regulate any person, either actually or potentially." 242 As the court
further said, "There are no elements of the regulation or enforcement of, or
of the planning or carrying on of, an ongoing or continuing program, or of
interference with executive discretion in new or existing programs of sub-
stantive character." 24
3
This perception that the veto issue under the Salary Act was different
because neither regulation nor law enforcement was involved, and no
congressional intrusion into program administration would occur, was not
consistently followed. The opinion contains loose language about the "ulti-
mate power" over the subject matter being "vested by the Constitution in
Congress,"244 and about pay setting being "at the center of the congression-
al sphere.''245 After all, there is very little that is not ultimately in the
congressional sphere by proper statute or even proposed constitutional
amendment. However, the one-house veto issue is whether that ultimate
power can be exercised by a part of Congress in nonstatutory mode. Similar
overbreadth in the rationale of the Court of Claims is found in its statement
that in exercising the delegated functions under the Salary Act the Executive
merely acts as "an agent of the legislative branch. "24 As already noted, in
a separation of powers system there is no room for a true "agency"
concept.247
Despite such loose encompassing language, and occasional references
to the "necessary and proper" clause, the court's conclusion that the one-
house veto was constitutional in the context of the Salary Act was cautiously
despite this tradition of legislative dominion the pay setting function "may properly be dele-
gated to the President." Id. at 1059.
241. The next two factors were: that while delegating, "Congress was much concerned
with its own pay and with the relationship of its own pay to that of the judges and other
officials; and that "although it wished to delegate, Congress was intent on retaining a large
measure of control." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1065. In my paper on the congressional veto, presented at the 1976 Association
of American Law Schools meeting in Houston, I had expressed this thought as follows: "They
[laws like the Salary or Reorganization Acts with a congressional veto provision] do not involve
creation of a new substantive program or tampering with the authorized administrative discre-
tion in an ongoing existing program." Speech by J. Dixon, ABA Assoc. of American Law
Schools Meeting, in Houston, Texas (Dec. 29, 1976) (copy on file with author). To similar effect
in Atkins is this statement: "The legislative veto in the Salary Act does not seek to enforce any
law, or appoint any agents to enforce the law, and is a device used in aid of legislation.
556 F.2d at 1070.
244. 556 F.2d at 1068.
245. Id. at 1061.
246. Id. at 1068.
247. See note 204 supra and text accompanying notes 201 & 204 supra.
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presented. The court noted that there had been no invasion of administrative
responsibility, but rather a reversal of "legislative" roles248 with the
constitutional influence of both President and Congress preserved, in its
view, because "nothing in the law is changed absent the concurrence of the
President and a majority in each House.''249 The court also noted that
because the Senate had disapproved the President's recommendations for
each salary category in 1974, the court did not have before it the issue of
constitutionality of a partial disallowance, even though under the Salary Act
partial vetoes are authorized. 250 Although the court refused to reach the
point, a partial veto would, of course, undercut the court's theory that the
President's parity with Congress in his legislative role was not being under-
cut by the congressional veto. In any event, with the two significant
qualifications mentioned, the court upheld the congressional veto and the
140 plaintiff judges, and all federal judges, gained nothing in 1977 from
President Nixon's regard for them in 1974.
B. The "Necessary and Proper" Clause Argument for the Congressional
Veto
The Atkins case also provided the occasion for airing a theory of
validation of the congressional veto heretofore largely ignored-the "neces-
sary and proper" clause of article I, section 8, clause 18.251 Development of
the theory came largely in the briefs, especially in the briefs for the Senate
and House as invited amici32 2 The Court of Claims' majority mentioned the
clause occasionally, largely as a makeweight,253 but fell far short of endors-
ing the breadth of the claims made for it by counsel.
Appeal to the necessary and proper clause to justify novel congression-
al excursions into the domains of the other two branches has antecedents in
other contexts than that of the congressional veto. Similar assertions were
made during the hearings in 1973 on the various bills to establish by statute a
248. 556 F.2d at 1065, 1067.
249. Id. at 1064.
250. See text accompanying note 222 supra. Although the 1977 amendment requires affirm-
ance by both houses of Congress if any pay increase is to take effect, it leaves untouched the
item veto issue. In fact, the 1977 amendment requires separate votes on each section of the
President's recommendations. 2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977).
251. "The Congress shall have the power. . .[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
252. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Frank Thompson, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
House Administration, United States House of Representatives [hereinafter cited as House
Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Nelson A. Rockefeller, President of the United States
Senate [hereinafter cited as Senate Brief].
253. See, e.g., 556 F.2d at 1061, 1071.
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special prosecutor immune from control by the President, 254 and the 1974
hearings on removing the entire Department of Justice from the executive
branch.255
The necessary and proper clause has a familiar first part, which gives to
Congress the power to make all laws "necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers," 256 the lawmaking and internal house-
keeping powers allocated to Congress in preceding parts of article I. The
less familiar, or at least less commonly invoked, second part gives to
Congress the same implementing power in respect to "all other powers
vested by this Constitution. "257 It has been suggested that the first part of
the clause may be viewed as having a "vertical effect," operating on the
powers expressly or impliedly allocated to Congress in article I, and that the
second part of the clause has a "horizontal effect," giving to Congress an
implementing and refining authority in respect to powers allocated to the
other two branches in article II, article III and the last two articles and the
amendments.38 In McCulloch v. Maryland259 an expansive reading was
254. See Special Prosecutor: Hearings on S. 2612 and S. 2603 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). The supporters of the proposal for an independent
special prosecutor relied primarily on article II, § 2, which vests in Congress the power to
control the source of appointments of inferior officers of the United States, to justify a court
appointed special prosecutor. As an added line of argument, supporters relied on the necessary
and proper clause. Professors Freund and Kurland admitted in their testimony that, without the
primary language about the appointments power, the necessary and proper clause alone would
be a shaky justification for the establishment of a special prosecutor. Id. at 166-67, 365
(testimony of Paul A. Freund & Philip B. Kurland).
There is no constitutional counterpart to the appointments clause language to rely on when
considering the legislative veto. The necessary and proper clause contains the language used for
primary constitutional justification by its supporters. However, as Acting Attorney General
Robert Bork pointed out in his testimony before the Senate committee, this sweeping clause
should properly be read as "a means of making the exercise of powers by the various branches
effective, not as a means of shifting powers between branches of government." Id. at 453
(testimony of Robert H. Bork, Acting Attorney General). See also Special Prosecutor and
Watergate Grand Jury Legislation: Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
255. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice Hearings on S. 2803 and S.
2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
256. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the "Sweeping Clause," 36
OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 823 n. 104 (1975). This essay, which was approvingly cited in both the House
Brief, supra note 252, at 28, and Senate Brief, supra note 252, at 8, in Atkins, is especially
aimed at containing executive initiatives. It rests on the following hypothesis derived from the
second part of the necessary and proper clause:
[Tihis clause assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to say by law what additional
authority, if any, the executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of powers
that are literally indispensable, rather than merely appropriate or helpful, to the
performance of their express duties under articles II and III of the Constitution.
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given to the first part of the clause, and a congressional power to charter a
national bank was found. The issue is whether such an expansive reading is
also appropriate in respect to the second part of the clause-a policy that
would have major implications for separation of powers.
The central proposition the Senate Brief derived from the clause was
that "Congress by law may specify the means and the manner by which the
powers vested in any branch or officer of the federal government may be
executed subject only to the limitation that it cannot contravene an express
constitutional provision," 260 or "take the action itself.' '261 Surely, no one
would object to specificity in congressional delegation of power to the
Executive, provided it follows the statutory mode prescribed in article I,
section 7, with presidential participation. 262 If discretionary powers are
conferred, however, which is virtually unavoidable in modern law enforce-
ment, it does not follow that Congress also has the power to insist on a
congressional checkoff day by day, decision by decision, before the ad-
ministrator can exercise the power. It likewise does not follow that Congress
has power to so limit a constitutionally prescribed power of another branch,
such as the presidential power of appointment of executive officials, that the
selection of the appointee is shifted to Congress, even though the President
still signs the appointing papers. 263 The separation of powers prohibition
Van Alstyne, supra at 794. There is, however, internal tension in the essay, because the author
at the same time deplores as "ill-considered" such Watergate-ingpired congressional initiatives
as placing prosecution and law enforcement outside Presidential control, exemplified by the
1974 attempt to place the Department of Justice outside the executive branch. Id. at 793.
259. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
260. Senate Brief, supra note 252, at 8.
261. Id. at 28.
262. The Senate Brief at this point seems to confuse the kind of control over executive
actions that may flow from a carefully worded statute, making some duties virtually ministerial,
with the kind of control-plus-derogation of prior statutory policy that may flow from a congres-
sional veto device. For example, in support of a broad "horizontal" approach to the necessary
and proper clause, Justice McReynolds is quoted, id. at 27, as saying in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926): "Perhaps the chief duty of the President is to carry into effect the will of
Congress through such instrumentalities as it has chosen to provide." Id. at 184 (MeReynolds,
J., dissenting). On its face this statement seems unobjectionable, provided it is borne in mind
that the "will of Congress" referred to by Justice McReynolds obviously is one in which the
President participates through his veto power.
Similarly supportive of the statutory power to create ministerial duties, but not of the
power to use a congressional veto, is the counsel's suggestion that the effect of the holding in
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), could be gotten around
by a statute specifying "who [other than a legislative offshoot], how, and for what the stock
could be voted." Senate Brief, supra at 28. In Springer, an oft-cited separation of powers case,
see, e.g., Kwai Chiu Yuen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 406 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.
1969), the Supreme Court had held invalid the creation of a legislatively controlled commission
to vote the stock in a government-owned corporation. 277 U.S. at 202-03.
263. Congress may fix some qualifications, but it would violate the principles of Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), to hem in the President completely.
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against the "same hands" doing both legislative and administrative work
must be linked to a power autonomy principle if it is to have meaning.
Otherwise, all power could be concentrated in Congress under the "horizon-
tal effect" of the necessary and proper clause. So long as Congress directed
the other branches in fine detail on how to carry out their delegated or
constitutionally conferred responsibilities, the "same hands" prohibition
technically would not be violated. In reality, those "different hands" that
exercised the power would be merely the hands of an agent, not of a
coordinate principal in a separation of powers, checks and balances system.
While not quite as insistent as the Senate Brief in using the necessary
and proper clause as an instrument to make the executive a mere agent of
Congress, the House Brief did rely on the clause to establish a plenary
discretion in Congress to oversee the exercise of delegated power. Viewing
the Salary Act as making a delegation of legislative power, the brief argued
that the article II status of the President yielded no defense against continued
congressional dominance on either of two theories: that the power remained
"legislative" despite the delegation; and that even if the President's action
under the delegation was viewed as an exercise of "executive power," it
was "exercisable only at the sufferance of Congress, acting pursuant to the
last portion of the 'necessary and proper' clause.' '264 What emerges here, as
in the Senate Brief, is a principle of congressional control of the executive,
without principled limits, via the necessary and proper clause.
It is noteworthy that both congressional briefs are cast in terms of a
general theory of congressional control of the Executive under the necessary
and proper clause. There was no attempt to develop a validating rationale for
the congressional veto limited to the special facts of Atkins, a special
"reverse legislation" theory implicit in the holding of the Atkins majority.
The Atkins dissenters felt that the broad implications of the necessary and
proper argument proved far too much, and swept away bicameralism, the
President's veto authority, and the vesting of executive authority in the
President.265 In short the amici, who carried the main burden of defending
the congressional veto in the final round of briefing, lost the argument but
won the case. 266
264. House Brief, supra note 252, at 27.
265. 556 F.2d at 1081-82 (Skelton, Kashiwa & Kunzig, J.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
266. In spite of the Department of Justice's attempt to finesse the veto issue in its brief for
the United States, the concession of unconstitutionality had slipped out in oral argument. See
text accompanying note 230 supra. When the House and Senate responded to the invitation to
brief the issue, the Department of Justice was put in an awkward position. Reorganization Act
authority, with its veto provision, had already been requested by President-elect Carter. See
note 27 and accompanying text supra. In Clark v. Valeo the government had conceded that the
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The "horizontal" necessary and proper clause argument has been
thought to receive some support from the judiciary's long acquiescence in
the theory that virtually none of article M is self-executing; that Congress,
not the courts, controls jurisdiction, form and procedure; and that, in
general, the courts may not act in the absence of some authorizing statute. 267
Even under Wayman v. Southard,2 68 however, must the judiciary accept all
rules of procedure Congress imposes? Suppose a rule imposed such rigid
time limits on decisions that judicious consideration was jeopardized? That
action would not contravene a specific protective clause, unless the resilient
due process concept could be invoked to bring to bear the trump card of
judicial review. In passing it may be noted that even the tradition of judicial
deference to Congress on matters of judicial procedure is not limitless. A
line is drawn, or attempted to be drawn, at the point at which Congress does
not content itself with general prescriptions but seeks instead to determine
the outcome of a pending case.269 Such congressional action affecting the
judicial process is directly analagous to what Congress does by legislative
veto, in certain of its manifestations: it displaces executive judgment on how
to execute the law under a governing statute that concededly admits of
alternative routes of implementation.
veto was clearly unconstitutional. 559 F.2d at 647-48. To file a brief in Atkins, responsive to the
amicus briefs, would have-emphasized the possible inconsistencies of the Department's posi-
tion vis-i-vis the vetoes in .the Salary Act, the Federal Election CampaignsAct and the
Reorganization Act. The United States did not file a reply brief in Atkins, and the burden of
attacking the veto as unconstitutional was left to plaintiffs. Their brief stressed that whatever
might be the reach of the necessary and proper clause it does not repeal the requirement of
bicameralism. Plaintiffs' Brief in Response to the Briefs of Amici Curiae at 29-32.
267. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825), the Supreme Court had to
decide whether the federal rules governing execution of judgments would prevail over state
rules. Chief Justice Marshall said,
The constitution concludes its enumeration of granted powers, with a'clause authoriz-
ing Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. The judicial
department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all which it has
power to render judgment. That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all
the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly
conferred by this clause, seems to be one of those plain positions which reasoning
cannot render plainer.
Id. at 10, 10 Wheat. at 22. See also Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15
ARIZ. L. REv. 229 (1973); Van Alystyne, supra note 258.
268. 23 U.S. 1, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825).
269. In United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), the Court held unconstitution-
al a law enacted while Klein's appeal was pending. The law interpreted a Presidential pardon to
mean that a property claimant had been a supporter of the rebellion, and thus required dismissal
for want of jurisdiction. The Court held that the right of appeal was not denied in a particular
class of cases, but as a means to deny the effect of a presidential pardon. The law was not a
valid exercise of the power of Congress to make exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction under
article III, § 2, but rather an improper attempt to control the outcome of a pending case. See
also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 315-16 (2d ed. 1973).
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The necessary and proper clause argument in its full sweep simply
proves too much, as the dissenting judges in Atkins, without explicit dispute
from the majority, perceived.270 It must be noted that in United States v.
Nixon271 the Supreme Court quite clearly adopted the view that implied
powers necessary to the effective discharge of the enumerated powers exist
under article II and article Im, and exist independent of congressional
sanction.272 On this basis the Court constitutionalized executive privilege,
and even hinted it might be absolute in some circumstances. On the facts
before it, however, the Court subjected the privilege to limitations needed to
preserve "the basic function of the courts.''273 It is fair to infer that the
Court thereby rejected a "vacuum cleaner" interpretation of the necessary
and proper clause, which would suck into Congress virtually all powers of
the other branches except those needed to sustain vital life signs.
C. Feasibility of a Narrow "Reverse Legislation" Category for the
Congressional Veto
As noted at the outset of this section, the Salary Act cases, and perhaps
the unlitigated Reorganization Act controversy, present the congressional
veto issue in a context more suggestive of "reverse legislation" than of an
attempted congressional hegemony over the administrative process.
Whether or not the difference assuredly amounts to a constitutional differ-
ence, it is an observable functional difference and has not gone unremarked.
Despite general opposition to the congressional veto expressed by Presidents
and their Attorneys General, 274 the position taken regarding Reorganization
Acts has varied from an opinion of unconstitutionality; 275 to acceptance in
silence; to an attempt, under Attorney General Tom Clark in 1949, to
rationalize it in terms at best contrived, 276 to the recent opinion of Attorney
General Bell on the current Reorganization Act. Here, a reverse legislation
theory begins to emerge with more clarity.277
270. See text accompanying note 265 supra.
271. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
272. Id. at 705 n.16.
273. Id. at 712.
274. See notes 15 & 20 and text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
275. Attorney General William Mitchell advised: "The attempt to give to either House of
Congress, by action which is not legislation, power to disapprove administrative acts, raises a
grave question as to the validity of the entire provision in the Act of June 30, 1932, for
Executive reorganization of governmental functions." Op. ANrr. GEN., supra note 83, at 63-64.
'276. A Department of Justice informal memorandum presented in 1949 fouid constitution-
al concurrent-resolution veto provisions. The opinion states that when the Congress disap-
proves a reorganization plan it is not "exercising a legislative function," but attaches no other
label. S. REP. No. 232, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1949).
277. Bell, Letter to the President, supra note 27, discussed at text accompanying note 289
infra. See also Remarks of William Rehnquist, Assitant Attorney General, before the Section
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For reasons already given, it would not be enough merely to say that
Congress has the constitutional power to fix salaries, and that in the Salary
Act Congress simply has made a "pragmatic judgment" that presidential
recommendations might be helpful in discharging salary-fixing authority. 278
In the Salary Act, as litigated prior to the 1977 amendment, Congress had
neither retained the matter for conventional disposition under article I,
section 7, nor delegated it to the Executive under intelligible standards,
subject to the check of ultimate judicial review. It had given the President
power to make recommendations that would become law if neither house of
Congress entered an objection.
Presumably, there would be no objection to a Salary Act that set up a
study commission in the executive branch to report information to Congress,
after receipt of which Congress by statute would enact salaries subject to
presidential review under his veto power. That would be a conventional
article I, section 7 type process, preserving the constitutional parity of
Congress and the President in the lawmaking process. How different was the
situation under the Salary Act with its initial one-house veto provision? Is
not the procedure for making the quadrennial changes in salaries still very
similar to the ordinary legislative process, except that the roles of Congress
and the President are, in a sense, reversed? Since it would take an affirma-
tive vote of both houses to bring a new salary statute into being, is there
anything wrong in asserting, analogously, that the President's recom-
mendation under the Salary Act is like a recommendation for new legisla-
tion, and simply fails for lack of support in one house? From the standpoint
of constitutional analysis, a presidential veto power after the congressional
action is not needed in this reverse legislation situation, because the Presi-
dent only proposes what he can accept. Also, the bicameralism principle is
not offended because in the ordinary legislative process a one-house nega-
tive blocks change in the law. The reverse legislation principle, in the
narrow area in which it applies, can thus be said not to ignore but to satisfy
the bicameralism principle.
Although the one-house veto would seem to be inoffensive in this
context, something would be very wrong if the Congress actually exercised
its veto on an item basis. An item veto, also referred to as selective or partial
veto, was authorized in the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of
1967-either House could negate "all or part of" the President's recom-
of Administrative Law of the ABA, Dallas, Texas, Committee Veto: Fifty Years of Sparring
Between the Executive and the Legislature (Aug. 12, 1969) (copy on file with author).
278. House Brief, supra note 252, at 16.
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mendations for each category of officials covered by the Act.27 9 For exam-
ple, Congress could negate the recommended increase for executive offi-
cials while allowing the increases for itself, federal judges and others to
become law. Item veto authorization is continued, even strengthened, in the
1977 amendment to the Salary Act. In switching from a provision for a one-
house negative to a provision for a two-house approval, the amendment
requires separate votes on each category in the President's recom-
mendation.2 80 Thus, the President-Congress constitutional parity under arti-
cle I, section 7, upon which the reverse legislation theory depends, would
not be obtained. The President's initial "consent" (evidenced by his salary
recommendations) would be destroyed by modifying his recommendations,
yet he could not apply his own veto power under article I, section 7 to this
new version of the law of the land. Not even the President, under his
constitutionally authorized veto authority, is deemed to have an item veto
power. 28 1 Supporters of a congressional veto in some form agree that an
item veto would be highly suspect and probably unconstitutional, but the
message seems to be slow in reaching Congress. 282 If the Salary Act were
further amended, however, to prohibit a congressional item veto,283 it would
appear to be a wholly inoffensive and constitutionally permissible form for
reverse legislation.
279. Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 225(i), 81 Stat. 644 (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B)
(1970)), as amended by Federal Salary Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, § 40(a), 91 Stat. 45
(codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977)).
280. 2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1977).
281. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1078-79 (Skelton, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
282. Cooper and Cooper, who support the use of the one-house veto as a legitimate means
of congressional control, agree that to protect the President nonamendability is essential.
Cooper & Cooper, supra note 11, at 512.
The Conference Committee report on the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a), 90 Stat. 475 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. § 437(c)
(West Cum. Supp. 1977)), which established a President-appointed commission, felt it neces-
sary to explain their definition of "rule or regulation" as follows:
[T]his provision does not give the Congress the power to revise proposed regulations
by disapproving a particular word, phrase, or sentence, but only gives each House of
the Congress the power to determine which proposed regulations of the Commission
constitute distinct regulations which can only be disapproved in whole. This provision
is intended to permit disapproval of discrete self-contained sections or subdivisions of
proposed regulations and is not intended to permit the rewriting of regulations by
piecemeal changes.
H. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976). See also Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 30, at
1397-1403 (study of the attempt to use an item veto against regulations submitted by the General
Services Administration to provide public access to Mr. Nixon's papers and tapes suggesting
that the functional result of an item veto is amendatory, and thus is more clearly unconstitution-
al than a non-item, one-house veto).
283. It should also be amended to place the Commission on Executive, Legislative and
Judicial Salaries under presidential appointment to avoid conflict with the principles of Buckley
v. Valeo, 421 U.S. at 109-43, as has been done with the Federal Election Commission, see 2
U.S.C.A. § 437(c)(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
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The Reorganization Acts that allow the President to reorganize the
executive branch or reallocate functions subject to a possible congressional
veto would seem to qualify for similar analysis, absent, of course, any item
veto power. The congressional veto in these acts does not interfere with the
administrative process of executing public law. It merely checks the Presi-
dent's authority to propose what may be regarded as amendments to the
existing statute-based structure of the executive branch. In respect to the
Salary Act, the congressional veto operates only on a presidential proposal
that amounts to a simple amendment to the existing salary scales for top
echelon officials. In neither situation is there any tampering with the au-
thorized administrative discretion in a continuous program of regulation of
the economy or distribution of welfare benefits, which, broadly viewed, are
the two primary domestic functions of the national government. To be sure,
in each situation there may be a sequence of actions, but each one is
essentially discrete and nonadministrative, dealing only with government
structure or government salaries. The change in the law that occurs in each
situation could be handled by statute if Congress chose to be more active. In
the strict sense of the term there has not been a "delegation" to the
Executive, but rather a shifting around of the article I, section 7 process for
basic lawmaking.
The situation would be quite different and article II of the Constitution
would enter the picture if a substantive program had been created and if the
congressional veto tampered with the authorized administrative discretion in
such an ongoing program. The congressional veto would then interfere with
the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, and
wholly apart from that clause, the congressional veto would operate to
create an unauthorized power for Congress. If anything is clear about our
constitutional plan of separation of powers, it is that members of Congress
are not to be administrators. 284 Inability to keep a delegation narrowly
limited provides no constitutional warrant for transforming Congress either
into a body of administrators or a body with shared administrative powers.
These last points also explain why the congressional veto does not
stand on any firmer constitutional footing if applied to a so-called indepen-
dent agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal
Election Commission. In the first place, it must be noted that the commis-
sions are still "executive" in that the President has the power of appoint-
ment, retains some removal power despite Humphrey's Executor v. United
284. See text accompanying notes 111-15 supra. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra
note 38 (J. Madison).
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States,285 and in practice has various other means of influence.2 86 Further, at
least two of the constitutional objections to the one-house veto, when
applied to ongoing administration and administrative rulemaking, are rele-
vant whether the action at issue is by a Cabinet agency or an "independent"
commission. These are (1) the bicameralism principle for direct congres-
sional policymaking, and (2) the article I reservation of a veto power to the
President over congressional actions that have the effect of narrowing the
scope of authority conferred by any existing statute. These considerations
are not affected by any limitations that may be imposed by statute on the
President's power to remove Commission officials, and thus on his power to
direct their discretion. 287
In more precise constitutional terms, the essential aspects of a potential
"reverse legislation" exception to the general objection to one-house vetoes
are the following: (1) viewing such statutes as the Salary and Reorganization
Acts as calling for a discrete sequence of legislative choices (even though
loosely bound together by an initial statute) that are not intertwined with
program administration, article II considerations are not reached; (2) the
President's article I role is preserved because instead of having a veto power
at the end, he has a proposal power at the beginning; (3) the congressional
role is preserved because unless both houses concur, by withholding a
negative, the status quo remains unchanged; and (4) it is critical to the
safeguarding of the President's role in this context that there be no selective
or partial veto power in Congress. If Congress has a power to modify, that
is, to negate part of the President's proposal but not all of it, with no
opportunity for the President to say whether he would agree to severability,
then his constitutional parity with Congress in lawmaking is undermined.
285. 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see text accompanying note 68 supra. The President is still given
the power to remove independent agency members for cause. 295 U.S. at 632. There is no
procedure for reviewing a President's assertion that a specific cause exists, and it is doubtful
that a court would review his judgment in this matter.
286. See Dixon, supra note 69, at 6-12 (noting 10 different "executive levers" for control-
ling some-aspects of the "independent" agencies; e.g., the clearance of agency budget propo-
sals through the Office of Management and Budget and the power of the President to select the
agency member who will serve as chairman).
287. Watson finds the application of the congressional veto to independent agencies a
dangerous means for congressional usurpation of additional power through resultant control of
the agencies. He notes that this use of the veto would not be categorized as reverse legislation,
since the President is not directly responsible for the regulations submitted by these agencies,
as distinguished from his role in the activities of the executive branch agencies. Watson, supra
note 11, at 1081.
Scalia points out that independent agencies were established to "take those matters which
should be decided on the basis of reason and analysis out of the political process. . . . It
would surely be ironic if, having set them up for that purpose, we suddenly throw them into the
cauldron of . . . political review of their activities." Symposium, supra nofe 22, at 700-01
(statement of A. Scalia).
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The one-house veto, if narrowly confined along the lines just indicated,
would seem to have a high claim for validation. Even absent one feature
here suggested as essential, the Court of Claims has validated it.288 Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell reached a result consistent with a reverse legislation
theory in arguing that the new Reorganization Act, with its one-house veto
provision as proposed by President Carter and thereafter enacted, would be
constitutional.289 In the course of a short opinion expressly limited to the
question of the constitutionality of the congressional veto in the Reorganiza-
tion Act context, Attorney General Bell noted that Congress and the Presi-
dent would possess "the same relative power as under the normal article I
legislative process" and added: "The reorganization statute does not in-
volve creation of a new substantive program or congressional interference
with authorized administrative discretion in an ongoing program." 290
D. Some Caveats and Rebuttals
Despite the symmetry of the argument in favor of a limited reverse
legislation exception to the general unconstitutionality of the legislative
veto, there are some problems in maintaining that the constitutional plan and
the constitutional parity of the President and Congress are unaffected. To
say that the President's role is preserved even without his usual veto power,
because he only proposes what he will accept, has initial plausibility. Yet it
may open the way for Congress, by mere majority vote rather than by the
two-thirds vote required to override a presidential veto, to insist on a policy
of inaction, and thus to repeal the basic policy of the initial statute. To that
extent, acceptance of the reverse legislation theory involves some potential
for undercutting the President's constitutional position under article I, sec-
tion 7, in respect to modification of prior statutory policy. Whether this risk
is real or fanciful would depend on how much of a "holding out," or
creation of justified expectations of governmental action, there was in the
initial authorizing statute. In the case of the Reorganization Acts, the only
"holding out," if there be any at all, is to the President, not to beneficiaries
288. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 98 S. Ct. 718 (1978).
The feature lacking is a ban on the item veto. Even though Atkins did not involve an exercise of
an item veto, the following issue should have been addressed: would Congress have enacted the
Salary Act absent an item veto? If the item veto were deemed inseverable the statute would fall
in its entirety. The Court of Claims sub silentio treated the item veto as severable, perhaps
without even recognizing the issue.
289. Bell, Letter to the President, supra note 27; see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
290. Bell, Letter to the President, supra note 27, at 3. Similar to one part of the Atkins
opinion, see note 243 supra, this quoted language tracks very closely some of the lines in my




of a governmental program. Such would not be the case for statutes, with a
congressional veto power annexed, creating regulatory or welfare dispens-
ing programs.
A further question relating to the bicameralism principle can be raised.
Nominally it is satisfied on the theory that "reverse legislation" (in the
situation of the Salary and Reorganization Acts) involves a potential se-
quence of simple legislative acts, nonaction caused by a one-house veto
being of the same dimension as action, insofar as the question of constitu-
tional validity is concerned. However, it may be argued that nonaction is not
always of the same constitutional dimension as action. Consider the situa-
tion in which the President and Congress have in deliberative fashion
worked out a "solution" to a problem, subject, however, to a one-house
veto on actual implementation. One house of Congress is thus enabled to
destroy the "solution" without the Congress as a whole facing the usual
legislative choices of actually repealing the organic act or continuing it in
modified fashion. A supposed example of this hazard may be seen in the
one-house veto that in 1974 blocked the increases recommended by the
President under the Salary Act.291 In addition, some irresponsibility may be
seen under the Salary and Reorganization Acts even when no congressional
veto is imposed to block a President's recommendation. A significant
change in government salaries and government structure is being made
without the Congress having to bear concurrent and contemporaneous re-
sponsibility with the President for the change.
Whether or not these suggested caveats about a reverse legislation
exception to the general invalidity of the congressional veto rise to the level
of indicating a constitutional defect in the theory, they are subject to some
rebuttal on pragmatic grounds. For example, concerning the 1974 one-house
veto action under the Salary Act, the dominant fact is that increase in
congressional salaries is a matter to which Congress has shown great
political sensitivity. This factor would operate equally forcefully in a se-
quence of regular legislative enactments dealing with salaries. When
Congress operates by regular statutory process it does not always make a full
series of hearings on the proposals a responsible precondition of final
congressional action. 292 Further, even with the one-house veto the Congress
291. See text accompanying note 223 supra.
292. For example, the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No.
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1977)), were essentially
the product of conference committee action on proposals by Senator Edward Kennedy, and
had little relation to the ground covered in the House and Senate hearings the year before. See
Hearings Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcomm. of the House
Government Operations Committee on H.R. 5425, H.R. 4960, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
Similarly, Senator Robert Kennedy added by floor amendment to the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
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can use the full legislative process of holding hearings and of going on
record as to the reasons for its action. 293
Concededly, a concern for the truncating of the usual legislative pro-
cess, and a shortening of the process of full deliberation and responsible
voting that may flow from acceptance of the legislative veto even in a
limited reverse legislation area, is a concern going to very relevant and
important considerations in a democratic political system. However, to try
to raise these legitimate concerns to the level of a general constitutional
requirement, as a basis for attacking the congressional veto on that ground,
proves too much. It proves too much because the regular bicameral statutory
mode of action does not guarantee use of full deliberative processes in each
instance in each house, as beneficial as that might be in the ideal world.
Indeed, if carried to its logical extreme, the argument would render equally
unconstitutional all delegated legislation (subordinate legislation in the Brit-
ish usage)2 94 under which important policy decisions are reached by ad-
ministrators without a full congressional deliberative process. So long as we
accept the principles of delegation-which, once it occurs, brings article II
considerations into play-it should be difficult to fault a one-house veto
provision in the limited Salary and Reorganization Acts situations where
article II considerations are not reached.
The goal of a full, responsible, congressional deliberative process is
reached, of course, under provisions such as those in the Salary Act as
amended. They specify that the President's proposal will never go into
effect unless approved by votes in both houses of Congress. 295 Such a
provision, however, probably should not be classified as a congressional
veto provision. The only difference from the process of ordinary legislation
that can be detected in the Salary Act as amended is that the President's own
veto power is lacking. That lack would be immaterial if, as is not the case in
the amended Salary Act, the Congress had to accept or reject the President's
considered proposals in their entirety.
In sum, even the regular legislative process is not perfect when tested
against all of the ideals the Framers had in mind for it, or that we now can
conceive. A reverse legislation concept, narrowly confined as here outlined,
Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)), the significant provision displacing New York's requirement of voter literacy in
English with a rule enfranchising those who had completed the sixth grade, in Spanish in Puerto
Rico. See [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2508, 2577.
293. Such full treatment was given in 1975 to proposed regulations submitted by the initial
Federal Election Commission. See the description by Judge MacKinnon in his separate opinion
in Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d at 679 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
294. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
295. See note 152 supra.
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would neither open up undue congressional tampering with the intertwined
processes of adjudication, rulemaking and general administration in ongoing
governmental programs, nor upset in a material way the parity of President
and Congress under article I, section 7. The reverse legislation theory,
whether or not it ultimately is held constitutional by the Supreme Court,
seems to offer a principled and limited variant on the orthodox processes of
lawmaking. The theory's built-in constraints also offer no basis for a vast
expansion of the congressional veto device that could threaten our basic
separation of powers system.
V. NOTE ON EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
Just as Watergate helped trigger a new demand for congressional
control of domestic affairs, so did Vietnam rekindle older concerns about
presidential dominance in foreign affairs, particularly through the making of
executive agreements. In both instances the congressional veto has been
viewed as a likely avenue for asserting more effective control. The direct
response to Vietnam was the War Powers Resolution, which contains its
own version of the congressional veto.2 96 Both before and since its passage
there have been attempts by Congress to enact a general statute subjecting
all or most executive agreements to some kind of congressional veto, the
preferred device being a concurrent resolution of disapproval. 297
For the purpose of constitutional analysis of these attempts to achieve
stronger congressional control, it may be useful to divide executive agree-
ments into three categories: 298 (1) agreements entered pursuant to authoriz-
ing legislation; 299 (2) agreements entered pursuant to treaty; and (3) agree-
ments entered pursuant to the President's independent foreign affairs power.
296. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V 1975).
297. See Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438Before
the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, supra note 22; Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements-1975:
Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 22; Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements:
Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The 1975 and 1976 hearings centered on bills seeking to
subject executive agreements to a potential two-house veto within sixty days of transmission to
Congress.
298. Compare the classifications in 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL ch. 700, reprinted in
Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438 Before the Sub-
comm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International
Relations, supra note 22, at 392.
299. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2487 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
Presidential authority to enter executive agreements and make corresponding tariff adjust-
ments within certain limits under the general delegation of 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. V 1975) is
not made subject to congressional veto. However, a constitutional question may be raised
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Executive agreements under prior statutory authorization may be di-
rectly analogized to the constitutional precepts already detailed in this article
for domestic delegations. Thus, the congressional veto likewise would be
inappropriate in the case of foreign affairs delegations. The proper analogy
would seem to be to statutory delegations of domestic rulemaking authority
to implement a statutorily established public policy. It would seem to follow
that a congressional veto that intrudes on the administration of a statutorily
authorized foreign affairs program is subject to the same constitutional
infirmities, on both article I and article II grounds, that arise when the veto
intrudes on the ongoing administration of a statutorily authorized pro-
gram.300
concerning various one-house and two-house veto provisions and a two-house approval provi-
sion, in id. § 2437 that relates to the President's special delegated authority to make bilateral
commercial agreements and extend nondiscriminatory treatment to countries not now receiving
it, for example, Communist bloc countries.
Somewhat closer to the line may be the President's delegated authority under id, § 2112 to
modify nontariff trade barriers (for example, import quotas) by executive agreement. The
authority is made subject not only to a requirement of advance consultation with Congress, but
also to a congressional approval requirement. The agreement cannot come into effect until
Congress enacts implementing legislation that has been submitted by the President along with a
statement of proposed implementing administrative action. Because the responsive congres-
sional action is by legislation, and because it may be supposed that legislation to revoke the
statutory authority, or to override a concluded agreement, would be constitutionally unobjec-
tionable, it may be argued that the approval provision in the context of § 2112 is likewise
permissible. The effect of this provision, however, may be to permit the two houses of
Congress, without opportunity for presidential veto, to change the substantive breadth of the
organic statute through a series of votes against particular agreements.
A more technical point is that § 2112 bars the possibility of self-executing agreements,
thereby making an inroad on normal administrative power. The point is best understood by way
of analogy. If a treaty is self-executing, then all that is required is consent of the Senate.
However, if a treaty necessarily requires legislation there is no way that the Executive can
force the Congress to pass the implementing bills; hence the failure of one house to agree to
implementing legislation defeats the treaty. Section 2112, by requiring implementing legislation
for all international agreements relating to nontariff trade barriers, has the effect of imposing a
one-house veto on any agreements that otherwise could be self-executing.
It may be noted that in the international trade area as well some congressional delegations
to the Executive for purely unilateral action are made, but are subject to constitutionally sus-
pect congressional veto provisions. An example is the import relief authority in id. § 2253. The
President may recommend import relief after he receives findings from the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) documenting the need for such relief. The President may
either accept the ITC's proposal, decline to grant import relief or follow his own course of
action. In the latter two instances he must repeat his decision to Congress. If both houses of
Congress vote to disapprove the presidential action the recommendation of the ITC becomes
effective.
This veto provision seems to violate two constitutional principles. In choosing between two
administrative interpretations in the exercise of delegated power the Congress becomes chief
administrator. Further, the § 2253 provision may give Congress the power to modify the original
statutory delegation. The veto here is not analogous to a failure to pass administration-proposed
le islation; new legislation in the form of increased protective duties or quotas could result, not
ject to presidential veto. See also 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (subjecting
to one-house veto the delegated authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to exclude the tariff
surcharge on subsidized foreign imports).
300. See text accompanying notes 194-215 supra.
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The question may be raised whether the potential "reverse legislation"
exception to the general unconstitutionality of the congressional veto has a
role to play in the category of executive agreements under prior statutory
authorization. It would seem to be clearly inapplicable to the second and
third categories of agreements, because its starting premise is the article I
constitutional parity of the President and the two houses of Congress on
general legislative matters. That parity is lacking in the case of agreements
pursuant to treaties and those made under the independent power of the
President. Even as to the first category of agreements, there seems to be
little or no place for a permissible "reverse legislation" exception. It would
be difficult to find foreign affairs analogs of the kind of activity that takes
place under the Reorganization and Salary Acts and that does not involve
executive discretion in administration of a program affecting public rights
and duties. 30 1
In making an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty the President is
implementing a specific constitutional process, the treaty process, which has
an understood international law meaning. Even if a veto provision were
imbedded in the treaty itself, and confined to the Senate, which alone under
our domestic law has power to ratify treaties, 3 2 it should still be highly
suspect. It would be in derogation of the international understanding of
"treaty," which, while not dispositive, may illuminate the purposes the
treaty power is intended to serve in our constitutional order and the standard
of execution to be maintained until the treaty is repudiated by conventional
processes. 30 3 Equally importantly, a treaty-authorized executive agreement
can also be viewed as analogous to a statutorily' authorized (delegated)
executive course of action, bringing into play the article 11 power of the
President to take care that the "law," including treaty law, be faithfully
executed. 304 Hence, the President's executive agreement actions in this
second category should be immune from congressional veto, as is his action
under statutes in general.
In the case of executive agreements under the President's independent
foreign or military affairs power, if an independent power to manage such
matters is conceded to exist, then the President by definition has the power
301. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
302. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
303. Recognition that the international setting informs the content of our international
relations power, particularly in respect to the role of the Executive, is found in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). On repudiation of treaties by Congress, see
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 163, 164 (1972).
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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to exercise it free from the congressional veto. 305 This statement may be a
bit too neat, for although a core of independent power is apparently
conceded by all and exists by objective necessity (for example, cease fire
agreements or coordination of military operations with allies), its penumbral
outreach is hotly debated.
This is an area in which separation of powers works its way more by
the political processes of contention, negotiation and compromise than by
appeals to clear constitutional text or authoritative adjudication. A
complicating element is that authority over the matter in question sometimes
may be concurrent but not equal, in the sense that the President possesses
power to act alone if Congress has provided no advance authorization or
guidance, but that Congress has the ultimate authority if it has signalled its
will by timely enactment or even by conscious rejection of a policy. The
clearest illustration of that kind of solo presidential authority subject to
potential congressional dominance is found in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer,306 especially as delineated in Justice Jackson's three-way break-
down of presidential authority. 307 In that case the Court nullified President
Truman's seizure of the steel mills to avert a strike during the Korean War.
The Court, however, did not nullify presidential seizure power per se, a
power exercised frequently during World War II;308 rather, it placed major
stress on the prior refusal of Congress to authorize the very seizure of power
exercised by the President.3°9
One commentator, who in general views the congressional veto as
unconstitutional, finds in this gray area some room for the congressional
veto. Focusing on the War Powers Act rather than executive agreements, H.
Lee Watson would accept the congressional veto as a device to negate
presidential action taken under independent, nonstatutory authority in areas
305. See L. HENKIN, supra note 303, at 177.
306. 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
307. Justice Jackson suggested the following mode of analysis. If the action is taken
pursuant to express or implied congressional authorization, the power of the President is at a
maximum because it rests on the combined constitutional power of the legislative and executive
branches. If the President acts contrary to the express will of Congress his power is at its lowest
ebb, because it can be justified only by a finding that the President has exclusive constitutional
authority in the area. In the middle is a twilight zone in which power may be concurrent or its
allocation uncertain. As a practical matter, failure of Congress to act in situations where
authority is shared may confirm "independent" presidential responsibility. Id. at 635-38 (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
308. See United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.), vacated as
moot, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); Dixon, Public Power and Critical Labor Disputes, 13 J. POL. 511
(1951).
309. The majority opinion of Justice Black and four of the five concurring opinions relied
on the refusal of Congress to give the President broad seizure powers. 343 U.S. at 586 (majority
opinion); id. at 599-602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 639 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at
657 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 663 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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in which Congress, by timely statute, would have possessed power to
control the Executive.31 Hence, he would accept that part of the War
Powers Resolution that provides that whenever the Armed Forces are en-
gaged in foreign hostilities without specific statutory authorization, they
shall be "removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution. '311 The suggested exception poses a problem in precise delinea-
tion. In some respects the independent or "solo" powers of the President
are concurrent with congressional power, but in some respects they are not.
This clearly is the thrust of some dicta in United States v. Nixon intimating
that there may be a wholly independent operation of executive privilege in
the national security field. 312 Youngstown itself did not purport to address
the question of presidential power in a "theater of war" context, as distinct
from domestic steel production. The President may well prevail in that
context and related contexts, at least for a limited period. In assessing the
constitutionality of the concurrent resolution provision in the War Powers
Act, therefore, we must ask whether the fact situations that may arise under
it would be analogous to the domestic factory seizure in Youngstown or
would present the difficult question of the President's independent article II
authority in a "theater of war."
A similar inquiry would have to be made in assessing the constitution-
ality of a congressional veto over executive agreements made pursuant to the
President's independent foreign affairs power, in those areas where it is not
conceded that the President's independent power is also exclusive, or at
least temporarily final, because of exigent circumstances. However, the
President normally would not have made the agreement unless he felt
constitutionally authorized, and in the foreign affairs area quickly respon-
sive consitutional adjudication as in Youngstown is unlikely. Thus, if the
President were disinclined to accord final power of interpretation of his
constitutional powers to Congress, the congressional veto device over such
executive agreements could be a device for constitutional confrontation--or
more likely, another round of political interplay between President and
Congress. 313
In sum, the congressional veto stands on no stronger constitutional
footing in respect to executive agreements than it does in respect to presi-
310. Watson, supra note 11, at 1082-86.
311. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (Supp. V 1975).
312. 418 U.S. at 705-14.
313. If the President concededly lacks authority to make an agreement under the three
available sources of power-his independent foreign or military affairs power, prior authorizing
treaty or prior authorizing legislation-yet names an executive agreement with the hope of
obtaining congressional approval, Congress possesses power to defeat the putative agreement
by nonaction or to ratify it in whole or in part. Such a defeat would not be a congressional veto.
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dential administration of statutes generally. Equally important are some
practical considerations. American foreign policy would be subject to severe
credibility problems abroad if it were subject to spasmodic derailment by a
House or Senate veto. Our separation of powers system is unique, and as
Covey Oliver has pointed out, the division of foreign affairs between the
executive and legislative branches already produces uncertainty and embar-
rassment. 314 Because there is a clear need to speak to the world in a manner
that shows that our promises will be honored, the attempt to increase
congressional control by the nonlegislative process of congressional veto is
as unwise as it is constitutionally suspect.315
VI. CONCLUSION
To write on the congressional veto at this stage is to write about a
shifting terrain. The main features of this terrain are a congressional pres-
sure to insert the veto control device in all manner of statutes, and to subject
all rulemaking to it; a vacillating executive response; and a total absence of
judicial review until 1977. Yet the congressional veto may raise the most
pressing separation of powers issue since Watergate. There may be strong
support in general democratic theory for the proposition that in our separated
powers system the Congress should be viewed as prinus inter pares. The
Founding Fathers, however, had significant reservations. They created a
much more balanced system, undergirded with several very specific textual
provisions. Under this system there is no room for a full-blown congression-
al veto, although a limited reverse legislation exception for the Salary and
Reorganization Acts may be constitutionally harmless and politically insig-
nificant, as the Court of Claims seemed to think in Atkins v. United States.
The difficulty with use of the congressional veto as a general congressional
control device over the administration of the government is that it goes
beyond the oversight function per se and becomes an intermeddling activity
with serious implications for responsible government and orderly policy
development. Pushed to its extreme, it would make the Congress not primus
inter pares, but simply primus.
314. Oliver, The United States and the World, 426 ANNALS 166 (1976).
315. The general unconstitutionality of the congressional veto in these foreign affairs
contexts does not mean, of course, that the President has unlimited power. His treaty-derived
power to make executive agreements can be lost by treaty modification or statutory modifica-
tion of the treaty. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888). Direct statutory authorization can be repealed. Further, the two houses are
under no enforceable compulsion to enact any needed funding or implementing legislation for
an executive agreement, or even for a Senate-ratified treaty.
